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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1980s and early 1990s have witnessed the extraordinary demise of
authoritarian regimes once thought to be a permanent fixture of the political
landscape. Defying old orthodoxies and alliances, communist governments in
Eastern Europe, military juntas in Latin America, and one-party states in
Africa have given way to governments chosen in free and open elections.1 "A
tide of democratic change is sweeping the world," Professor Rustow recently
declared,2 and the numbers bear him out. At the turn of the century only nine
countries could legitimately be called "democratic," even excluding the ques-
tion of women's suffrage.3 The number rose to twenty-one by 1929 and
twenty-nine by 1960.' By 1990, according to one survey, sixty-five countries
chose their governments in elections marked by "fair electoral laws, equal
campaigning opportunities, fair polling and honest tabulation of ballots. 5
1 See generally ELIE ABEL, THE SHATTERED BLOC: BEHIND THE UPHEAVAL IN EASTERN EUROPE
(1990); Mark Falcoff, The Democratic Prospect in Latin America, WASH. Q., Spring 1990, at 183; Carol
Lancaster, Democracy in Africa, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1991-92, at 148. A slightly broader historical
framework might identify these changes with the transitions to democratic rule in Greece, Spain, and
Portugal of a generation earlier. See Arend Lijphart et al., A Mediterranean Model of Democracy? The
Southern European Democracies in Comparative Perspective, W. EUR. POL. 1 (1988).
2 Dankwart A. Rustow, Democracy: A Global Revolution?, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 75, 75 (1990).
3 G. BINO3HAM POWELL, JR., CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 238 n.3 (1982).
4 Id.
5 FREEDOM HOUSE SURVEY TEAM, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: POLITICAL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES
1990-1991, at 47, 49 (1991).
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These domestic developments have occurred within a broader context,
affecting traditional concepts of state sovereignty in international law. First,
codification of political rights in international and regional human rights
treaties accompanied democratization at the national level.6 These treaties
reflect a growing international commitment to minimum standards of human
rights generally and political rights in particular.7 Second, an increasing
number of states have invited multinational organizations to monitor their
elections, hoping that monitoring will bolster both the domestic and internation-
al legitimacy of their fragile governments. The work of the United Nations
predominates this field:' in little more than a year the United Nations accepted
invitations to monitor elections in Namibia (November 1989), Nicaragua
(February 1990), and Haiti (December 1990).' Election monitoring appears
6 Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned
in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen repre-
sentatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of
the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1986, art. 25, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 179 [hereinafter Political Covenant]; see also African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, June 26, 1981, art. 13(1), O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEGI67/3/Rev. 5, 9 I.L.M. 58, 61 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter African Charter] ("[e]very citizen shall have the right to freely participate in the government of his
country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the
law"); American Convention on Human Rights, openedforsignature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 23(1)(b), 36 OAS
T.S. 1, OAE/ser. L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6, 9 I.L.M. 673, 682 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention]
(stating that every citizen shall enjoy right "to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will
of the voters"); International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 5(c), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 220 (stating that signatories undertake to eliminate
racial discrimination in enjoyment of rights "to participate in elections-to vote and to stand for election-on
the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public
affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service"); Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, opened for signature Mar. 31, 1953, art. 1, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 1911, 193 U.N.T.S. 135, 136
("[w]omen shall be entitled to vote in all elections on equal terms with men, without any discrimination");
Protocol (No. 1) to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature Mar. 20, 1952, art. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, 264 [hereinafter European
Protocol] (stating signatories' obligation "to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot,
under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature"); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res. 217 (1I) A, U.N. Doc. A/810,
art. 21, at 75 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration] ("[e]veryone has the right to take part in the
government of his country directly or through freely chosen representatives").
7 See generally Louis HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978).
8 The Organization of American States (OAS) also has actively monitored elections. The OAS General
Assembly voted in June 1990 to create a permanent Unit for Democratic Development, which would
provide member states "with advice or assistance to preserve or strengthen their political institutions and
democratic procedures." Unit for Democratic Development, AGIRES. 1063 (XX-O/90), at 109,
OAE/ser.P/XX.O.2 (1990).
9 See infra notes 202-262 and accompanying text. During the same period the Secretary-General
received an invitation to send observers to Romania, which he declined. See U.N. Says it Won't Monitor
Romanian Elections, Reuters, Jan. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (quoting U.N.
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likely to become a regular U.N. activity: the General Assembly has accepted
permanent guidelines to govern future U.N. monitoring missions'0 and has
voted to establish a central coordinator for monitoring activities within the
Secretariat."
Political scientists have been quick to analyze various facets of this new
"liberal internationalism."12 Yet the literature has generally lacked a discus-
sion of whether a universal right to participate in the selection of one's own
national government 3 exists in international law. 4 This article traces the
spokesman's explanation that "the U.N. does not monitor internal elections in a country"). However, the
United Nations assumed a supervisory role in elections in Cambodia and a plebiscite in the Western Sahara.
See Letter Dated 30 October 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 24, U.N. Doe.
A/461608 (1991) (annexing The Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, a treaty detailing U.N.
role in organizing and observing Cambodian elections); S.C. Res. 690, U.N. SCOR, 2984th mtg., U.N.
Doe. S/RES/690 (1991) (establishing United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara). See infra
notes 265-269 and accompanying text (discussing Western Sahara and Cambodian monitoring missions).
10 Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 98(b), at25, U.N. Doec. A/46/609 (1990); G.A.
Res. 46/137, reprinted in United Nations Department of Public Information, Resolutions and Decisions
Adopted by the G.A. During the First Part of Its 46th Session, Press Release GA/8307, at 365 (1992)
(approving proposed guidelines).
11 The Resolution requires the Secretary-General to designate a senior member of his staff to perform
the following functions:
[To] assist the Secretary-General to coordinate and consider requests for electoral verification
and to channel requests for electoral assistance to the appropriate office or programme, to ensure
careful consideration of requests for electoral verification, to build on experience gained to
develop an institutional memory, to develop and maintain a roster of international experts who
could provide technical assistance as well as assist in the verification of electoral processes and
to maintain contact with regional and other intergovernmental organizations to ensure appropriate
working arrangements with them and the avoidance of duplication of efforts ....
G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 10, at 365.
12 See e.g., Richard N. Gardner, The Comeback of Liberal Internationalism, WASH. Q., Summer
1990, at 23. For discussion of the prospects for democracy in various regions, see Nathan Keyfitz, The
Asian Road to Democracy, 26 Soc'Y 71 (1988); Gibson Kamau Kuria, Human Rights and Democracy in
Africa, FLETCHER F., Winter 1991, at 23; Giacomo Luciani, Economic Foundations of Democracy and
Authoritarianism: The Arab World in Comparative Perspective, ARAB STuD. Q., Fall 1988, at 457; John
Sloan, The Policy Capabilities of Democratic Regimes in Latin America, 24 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 113
(1989). On the process of democratic transition, see Juan J. Linz, Transitions to Democracy, WASH. Q.,
Summer 1990, at 143. On the historical development of the democratic state, see generally DAVID HELD,
POLITICAL THEORY AND THE MODERN STATE (1989); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, TIM THIRD WAVE:
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991). On the promotion of democratic govern-
ment in national foreign policy, see EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
(Abraham F. Lowenthal ed., 1991) [hereinafter EXPORTING DEMOCRACY]; THE NEW DEMOCRACIES:
GLOBAL CHANGE AND U.S. POLICY (Brad Roberts ed., 1990). On the relationship between democracy
and economic development, see Enrique A. Baloyra, Democracy Despite Development, 150 WORLD AFF.
73 (1987). On the question of how democratic institutions can be sustained, see Larry Diamond et al.,
Building and Sustaining Democratic Government in Developing Countries: Some Tentative Findings, 150
WORLD AFF. 5 (1987). On support for democracy among third world intellectuals, see Mehran Kamrava,
Intellectuals and Democracy in the Third World, 14 J. Soc. POL. & ECON. STUD. 227 (1989). And on
whether elected regimes are less likely than others to initiate international conflict, see Michael W. Doyle,
Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. Sc. RE,. 1151 (1986); Brad Roberts, Democracy and World
Order, FLETCHER F., Summer 1991, at 9; Robert L. Rothstein, Democracy, Conflict, and Development
in the Third World, WASH. Q., Spring 1991, at 43, 46-52 (summarizing major arguments and literature).
13 This article refers to such rights as "participatory rights."
The Right to Political Participation
emergence of participatory rights in international law, focusing on the develop-
ment and application of international and regional treaties and principles
derived from U.N.-sponsored election monitoring guidelines. This article
argues that these treaties establish a right to political participation amongst
signatory states, and evidence an emerging universal right to political participa-
tion not contingent upon treaty agreements.
Part I first outlines international participatory rights before the advent of
the post-war human rights treaties. It then examines the treaties themselves,
and argues that the essential elements of a "free and fair" election can now be
described as a matter of law. Over one hundred states have signed the Political
Covenant, and dozens have signed regional treaties with similar provisions.
Treaty signatories formally commit themselves to create and protect participa-
tory rights; these treaties thus create binding international obligations that exist
independently of the enforcement capacity of the international system. Because
signatory states effectively relinquish some measure of sovereignty in domestic
affairs, the treaties demonstrate that, for certain purposes, the notion of
"popular" sovereignty (inherent in the right to political participation) supplants
traditional "state" sovereignty in international law.
Part II examines the international community's past efforts to enforce
participatory rights through election monitoring. 15 Although election monitor-
ing has proceeded by invitation rather than imposition, various monitoring
missions are evidence of the emerging right to political participation, and
provide interstitial principles supplementing the rights outlined in the treaties.
Because states have discovered that election monitoring helps to legitimize their
governments, election monitoring activity will increase.
Interestingly, the United Nations has not invoked the treaty provisions when
setting monitoring standards. Instead, the United Nations has styled standards
14 But see Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
46 (1992) [hereinafter Franck, Emerging Right]; Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Based Prospects for
a New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 601,621-40 (1990) [hereinafter Franck, New Global
Order] (discussing democracy as emerging "global entitlement"). Legal writing on participatory rights was
extremely scarce before recent events in Eastern Europe stimulated much of the political science literature
cited above. See, e.g., Geert van Haegendoren, International Election Monitoring, 20 REVUE BELG.E DE
DROrT INTERNATIONAL 86 (1987); John P. Humphry, Political and Related Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); Karl J. Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and
Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 209, 238-45 (Louis Henkin
ed., 1981) (discussing political freedoms in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); Henry
J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTs. Y.B. 77 (1988).
15 Several non-government organizations actively monitored elections in addition to the United
Nations, in particular the International Human Rights Law Group, the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs, and the Carter Center at Emory University. See, e.g., COUNciL OF FREELY ELECTED
HEADS OF GOV'T & NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT'L AFFAIRS, 1990 ELECTIONS IN THE
DOMINIcAN REPUBLIC: REPORT OF AN OBSEIVER DELEGATION (1990); INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW GROUP, GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION MONIrORING (1984); NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
INST. FOR INT'L AFFAIRS, NATION BUILDING: THE U.N. AND NAMIBIA (1990) [hereinafter NATION BUH.D-
ING].
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which parallel treaty provisions in virtually all respects. Although these
standards have guided the supervision of many elections, Part IMI argues that
in future monitoring missions the United Nations should not rely upon such
mission-specific guidelines to the exclusion of carefully drafted treaty norms.
Since treaties provide a far more permanent and universal foundation than
customary monitoring guidelines, reliance upon the treaties will lend an
additional degree of legitimacy to processes that invoke them. Therefore, the
United Nations should take the logical step of invoking the treaties directly
when sanctioning future monitoring missions. In so doing, the United Nations
would help craft an institutionalized enforcement mechanism to hold states to
their treaty obligations.
International organizations can also enforce participatory rights by basing
their accreditation decisions upon election monitoring results, given the vicissi-
tude of bilateral recognition practices.16 The United Nations General Assem-
bly, as the primary global forum that can accommodate such a process,
possesses a unique potential to advance participatory rights by basing its
* accreditation decisions upon election monitoring results. Thus, Part IV argues
that the United Nations should use the recommendations of election monitors
as a basis for seating delegates, to effectively combine the norms developed
by the treaties and the mission guidelines with the "enforcement capability"
of the observer missions, and thereby enhance the international and domestic
legitimacy of democratically elected governments.
HI. THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS
A. Participatory Rights Before 1948: The Reign of the State Sovereignty
Approach
All human rights law presents a challenge to traditional notions of state
sovereignty. In this sense the right to political participation is unexceptional.
But participatory rights involve not only specific limits on state sovereignty
in given areas, but the more fundamental question of who holds sovereign
authority within a state. For most of recent history "the sovereign" has been
that person or group actually wielding political power. The right to participa-
tion rejects this de facto control test by asserting that the mass of citizens is
the ultimate repository of sovereignty. Participatory rights have thus created
an acute tension within international law. This section briefly considers the
sources of the conflict between traditional "absolutist" sovereignty and the
emerging notion of "popular" sovereignty.
16 See IAN BROWNLm, PRNCIPLES OF PUBIC INrERNATIONAL LAW 95 (4th ed. 1990).
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The traditional exclusion of participatory rights from international law can
be explained by two sets of factors; those generic to all human rights norms
and others specific to the right itself. The generic reasons are well known. The
international law of human rights emerged following the Second World War,
a product of such events as the Nuremberg Trials, the founding of the United
Nations, and the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1948.17 Before the Second World War, "apart
from a few anomalous cases, in which individuals were allowed to vindicate
their rights directly on the basis of a special international agreement, individu-
als were not subjects of rights and duties under international law."18 States
in the nineteenth century, caught increasingly in the throes of aggressive
nationalism, saw their domestic political institutions as essential components
of a unique national culture. In order to protect these institutions from external
pressures, the dominant states of Europe shaped an international law that
carved out an exclusive sphere of domestic jurisdiction. 19 A fortress-like
conception of state sovereignty endowed governments with "a monopoly over
fundamental political decisions, as well as over legislative, executive and
judicial powers. "20
An individual right to participate in government did not and could not arise
in this international legal climate. The manner in which states chose their
leaders formed a central feature of the protected domestic sphere.21 Statism
found its ultimate expression during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
in the conception of nations as autonomous moral beings which, in the selec-
tion of their leaders, gave expression to their national personalities.' Vattel,
who conceived of political societies as functioning moral persons, described
the national sovereign as "the moral person" of his state. Once chosen, a
sovereign became "the depository of the obligations relative to government"
and other persons, while not "absolutely ceasing to exist in the nation, act[]
17 See generally Louis Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 9-17 (1982) (discussing development of international law of
human rights).
18 Id. at 9.
19 See MATrHEW S. ANDERSON, THE ASCENDANCY OF EUROPE 140-50 (1972).
20 Georg Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 397, 404
(Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1987).
21 Henry Wheaton's views were typical of the period: "The perfect independence of every sovereign
State in, respect to its political institutions, extends to the choice of the supreme magistrate and other rulers,
as well as to the form of government itself." HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135
(2nd ann. ed. 1863).
22 Id. at 132 ("Every state, as a distinct moral being, independent of every other, may freely exercise
all its sovereign rights in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of other states. Among these
is that of establishing, altering, or abolishing its own municipal constitution of government.") Professor
Tes6n has termed this view the "Hegelian Myth." FERNANDO TES6N, HUMANITARiAN INTERVENTION: AN
INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALTrY 53-76 (1988).
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thencewards only in him and by him."' To condemn the process of choosing
a leader, therefore, was to impugn the character of the nation itself.
Two more specific factors also contributed to the late emergence of partici-
patory rights in international law. The first is that national elections did not
become commonplace until the mid-nineteenth century.24 An international
requirement of free and fair elections could not reasonably be expected to arise
until elections in individual states became the norm. Until the mid-twentieth
century, however, many states were still engaged in national debates over the
nature, power, and extent of representative institutions.' Even in 1948, when
participatory rights were first formally expressed in the Universal Declaration,
full adult suffrage was less than a generation old in many European coun-
tries.2
6
The second specific cause of the late emergence of participatory rights
relates to the treatment of unelected governments by the international communi-
ty. Governments which obtain power in violation of participatory rights (i.e.,
without holding proper elections) do so illegally. Presumably, such govern-
23 I mBERDE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. IV, § 40 (Joseph Chitty ed. 1849) (1759) (emphasis
in first quotation added).
24 See ALAN F. HATrERsLEY, A SHORT HISTORY OF DIEmOCRcY 161 (1930); Leslie Lipson, THE
DE OCRATIC CIVILIZATION 79 (1964); STEIN ROKKAN, CITIZENS, ELECTIONS, PARTIES: APPROACHES TO
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE PROCESSES OF DEVELOPMENT 84-85 (1970).
25 Although several European states had functioning parliamentary bodies in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, the size of their electoral base looks negligible by modem standards. HAMrEltSLEY,
supra note 24, at 120-40. In mid-eighteenth century Britain, for example, no more than one in 20 citizens
was eligible to vote for the House of Commons. LIPSON, supra note 24, at 80. Only after the twin
upheavals of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars did representative institutions began to
proliferate and the base of suffrage expand. HATr LEY, supra note 24, at 161-62. In Belgium, which
gained independence in 1830, the first constitution established a bicameral parliament with suffrage limited
to men over 25 years of age who paid a minimum tax. Universal male suffrage was not introduced until
1893. THOMAS F. MACKIE & RICHARD ROSE, THE INTERNATIONAL ALMANAC OF ELECTORAL HISTORY
39 (3rd rev. ed. 1991). In France universal male suffrage for a Constituent Assembly was not instituted
until 1848. Id. at 130-31. In the Netherlands a States-General was introduced in 1848; 11% of the adult
male population was eligible to vote. Universal male suffrage did not appear until 1917. Id. at 322. In
Norway the constitution of 1814 enfranchised about 28% of the adult male population; suffrage for virtually
all males over 25 was introduced in 1898. Id. at 356. In Spain the constitution of 1812 tempered royal
power by enacting broad franchise provisions, but a series of coups disrupted the work of parliament. Id.
at 385-86. In the United Kingdom the Reform Act of 1832, much heralded as broadening the base of
representation, increased the parliamentary electorate from 2.7% to 4.4% of the population. Successive
reform bills in 1867 and 1884 gave the vote to most adult males. Until 1948 university graduates and
businessmen were allowed two votes each. Id. at 438-39; HATERSLEY, supra note 24, at 164-65; LIPSON,
supra note 24, at 80-81. In the United States, members of the presidential electoral college were not chosen
by direct election in all states until 1860. MACKIE & ROSE, supra, at 456. Senators were chosen by state
legislatures until 1913, and poll taxes were only eliminated by constitutional amendment in 1964. U.S.
CONST. amends. XVII, XXIV.
26 Women became entitled to vote on equal standing with men on the following dates: Austria (1920);
Belgium (1948); France (1944); Germany (1919); Greece (1956); Italy (1948); the Netherlands (1919);
Norway (1913); Portugal (1968); Spain (1931); Sweden (1921); United Kingdom (1928); United States
(1920). MACKIE & ROSE, supra note 25, passim.
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ments would themselves be considered illegal.2" For most of recent history,
however, the international law of recognition has paid little or no attention to
the manner in which regimes are chosen. Rather, states have generally been
free to conduct relations with governments which, under a scheme of participa-
tory rights, would likely be regarded as pariahs.
This aspect of recognition law-a specific application of traditional sover-
eignty principles-has deep historical roots. From the Middle Ages through
the era of royal absolutism, the doctrine of monarchical legitimacy dominated
commentaries on the law of recognition.2" While obviously quite different
from the "popular legitimacy" embodied in a right to political participation,
monarchical legitimacy also predicated a regime's authority to govern on the
circumstances of its origin. Whether by virtue of divine right or through a
theory of implied popular consent, dynastic succession entitled a government
to international recognition." Monarchical legitimacy began to fall out of
favor with the rise of Enlightenment-era theories of popular sovereignty.
Vattel, writing in 1758, rejected the doctrine entirely in favor of a de facto
control test:
If a people, after having expelled their prince, submit to another-if they change
the order of succession, and acknowledge a sovereign to the prejudice of the natural
and appointed heir-foreign powers may, in this instance also, consider what has
been done as lawful; it is no quarrel or business of theirs?'
Monarchical legitimacy reemerged briefly in the early nineteenth century
as a reaction to the French Revolution. In November 1792 the French Assem-
bly extended its "fraternity and succor to all peoples bent on recovering their
liberty," a declaration which the European monarchies regarded as profoundly
subversive of the established order..3 1 At the Congress of Vienna in 1814,
restoration of the status quo ante bellum was the primary goal of the assembled
powers. It was, ironically, the French minister Talleyrand who argued most
27 To argue otherwise one must defend the proposition that the process of selecting a regime can be
legally separated from the regime actually selected. Participatory rights, however, are instrumental: they
are a means by which citizens make their views known and felt in the formulation of national policy. If
citizens are excluded from the political process, those rights have not been instrumental in achieving
anything. This delineation of a "proper" process creates a threshold of legitimacy that all governments must
meet.
28 TI-CHIN G CHEN, THE INTENATIONALLAW OF RECOGNMON 105 (1951); JULIUS GOEBEL, JR.,
THE REcOGNITION POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 19-41 (1915).
29 CHEN, supra note 28, at 105.
30 IV VATTEL, supra note 23, ch. V § 68. Recognition of governments exercising effective power
also became common in practice, as in the case of the English republic under Cromwell. Jochen A.
Fromein, Recognition, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 340, 341 (Rudolf Bernhardt
ed., 1987).
31 CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALIrY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (1957). Even
before this decree was issued the German Emperor had urged other European powers to terminate "the
scandal of usurpation founded on rebellion." CHEN, supra note 28, at 105 (quoting THEODORE D.
WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1879)).
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vigorously for the indefeasible right of a ruling dynasty to foreign recogni-
tion." The settlement at Vienna restored France to its pre-revolutionary
boundaries, brought Louis XVIII to the throne, and led to the establishment
of the Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, whose primary interest
lay in "maintaining the absolutist regimes and in suppressing revolutionary
movements everywhere by intervention."33 As a result, the notion of legitima-
cy for purposes of recognizing governments came to be used to support
monarchical succession. Instead of defining a "legitimate" government as one
that had its origins in popular consent (the Enlightenment view), the doctrine
was now used to resist pressures for liberal reforms. As one historian has
written, "[a]gainst the international of peoples the international of rulers had
won. 
3 4
Despite the efforts at Vienna, however, neither monarchical nor popular
legitimacy took hold as a doctrine of international law for three reasons. First,
either standard would inevitably have created a hierarchy of regimes based on
legitimacy of origin. Such an arrangement was incompatible with the emerging
"balance of power" configuration in Europe, which presumed the existence of
free and equal sovereigns, each enjoying virtually complete freedom to order
its domestic affairs." Second, the idea that forms of government ought to be
fixed and immutable (of specific monarchical pedigree or the result of fair
elections) simply proved impossible to implement in practice. The problem was
one of infinite regression, for "all governments owe their origin to a revolu-
tionary event in a more or less distant past. "M Any regime, in other words,
was potentially "illegitimate" given a sufficiently long historical view. Third,
the political upheavals in Europe during the nineteenth century, particularly
those following 1848, made recognition of de facto governments a political
necessity. 37 France, for example, alternated regularly between monarchy and
republic from 1791 to 1875, and any state refusing to recognize such rapid
changes in government would find itself diplomatically isolated. European
leaders recognized that the legitimacy doctrine was for this reason incompatible
with practical politics. 3
32 DE VISSCHER, supra note 31, at 27; see also RENE ALBRECHT-CARRIt, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
OF EUROPE SINCE THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 9 (1958); GOEBEL, supra note 28, at 19. Talleyrand set out
his views in his instructions to the King's ministers at the Vienna Congress. These are reprinted in POSTURE
OF EUROPE, 1815-1940: READINGS IN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 9 (Eugene C. Black ed. 1964).
33 ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 188 (rev. ed. 1954); see also
ALBRECHT-CARRIe, supra note 32, at 9.
34 ALBRECHT-CARRIE, supra note 32, at 16.
35 MORTON A. KAPLAN & NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (1961).
36 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of Governments, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 815, 832 (1945).
37 KAPLAN & KATZENBACH, supra note 35, at 122-23.
38 CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (4th ed. 1965).
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Most states have come to reject fixed rules on the recognition of govern-
ments.3 9 A decision to recognize domestically illegitimate regimes is less a
reflection of a state's position on the value of participatory rights than a
judgment of political expediency. As a result, most states follow a de facto
rather than a de jure standard in their bilateral recognition practices.' Even
the United States, which has at times alluded to a policy of constitutional
legitimacy, generally adheres to a de facto control standard.4 In sum, the
central tenets of recognition law have never turned on judgments about the
domestic legitimacy of governments. Instead, states and commentators general-
ly eschewed concern with the character of national government well into the
twentieth century.42 Oppenheim's 1905 statement is typical: "The Law of
Nations prescribes no rules as regards the kind of head a State may have.
Every State is, naturally, independent regarding this point, possessing the
faculty of adopting any Constitution according to its discretion."43
39 BRowNLIE, supra note 16, at 93.
40 Id. at 92-93.
41 The classic American statement of recognition policy is generally taken to be Thomas Jefferson's
formulation, stated in 1792: "It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be rightful
which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared." Quoted in FENWICK, supra note 38, at
187. In practice, however, the United States has rarely required proof of a "substantial declaration" of
popular will. See Maurice Cranston, FromLegitimismto Legitimacy, in LEGrIMACY 36, 40-41 (Athanasios
Moulakis ed., 1986).
The policy of President Woodrow Wilson is the major exception to U.S. adherence to the de facto
control standard. In 1913 Wilson announced that the United States would no longer recognize Latin
American governments that came to power by extra-constitutionalmeans. Recognition, 1 Hackworth DIGEST
§ 33, at 180-81; Paul W. Drake, From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912-1932, in EXPORTING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 12, at 3, 13. This policy followed the so-called Tobar Doctrine of non-recogni-
tion, embodied in two treaties among the Central American republics. See, e.g., Additional Convention
to the General Treaty between the Governments of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Salvador, Respecting Recognition of Governments, Intervention and Re-election of Presidents, Dec. 20,
1907, art. II, 206 Consol T.S. 77 (stating agreement not to "recognize any other Government which may
come into power in any of the five Republics as a consequence of a coup d'itat, or of a revolution against
the recognized Government"). The United States used this policy from Wilson's presidency through the
early 1930s as justification for armed intervention in Latin America. The occupying U.S. marines often
found themselves observing local elections as a precursor to a decision on recognition by Washington.
Drake, supra, at 15-34. Secretary Stimson announced the abandonment of the constitutional legitimacy
doctrine in 1931. See Ellery C. Stowell, ConstitutionalLegitimacy, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 302, 302 (1931).
The United States recognized the revolutionary Soviet government two years later, reversing a 16-year
policy. See Chandler P. Anderson, Editorial Comment, Recognition of Russia, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 90, 90
(1934).
The United States currently denies that the issue of recognition arises upon a change of government
in a foreign country. Rather, the United States continues its relations with the foreign state without formally
determining the legitimacy of the new regime. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 203, reporters' note
1. The U.S. decision to join an OAS Ministers' resolution in October 1991, refusing to recognize the
military government that overthrew the elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was therefore
a significant break with this policy. See Thomas L. Friedman, Haiti's Coup: Test Case for Bush's New
World Order, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1991, at A8.
42 While earlier writers also held such sentiments, their views are unexceptional given that virtually
all states prior to the nineteenth century were governed by monarchies.
43 1 LASA OPPENHEim, INTERNATIONAL LAW 403 (1905). In 1910 Professor Wilson declared bluntly
in his Handbook of International Law that "[there is for international law no distinction between monarchy
and republic, confederation and federation, simple and composite states." GEORGE G. WILSON, HANDBOOK
549
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Such views represented a choice between two conflicting notions of sover-
eignty. The first is commonly referred to as "state" or "absolutist" sovereignty.
It regards as "sovereign" that individual or entity, traditionally a monarch,
wielding actual political power within a state. Other states must treat that
person as exercising all prerogatives of national power both externally (in
conducting foreign relations) and internally (in managing the affairs of govern-
ment)." In recognition law the absolutist concept of sovereignty is applied
through the de facto control test.
The second notion is referred to as "popular" sovereignty. Stated broadly,
popular sovereignty is the view that individual citizens bestow legitimacy upon
a government through their implied or actual consent to its rule.45 In contrast
to the absolutist focus on relations within the international community, popular
sovereignty looks to the political role of individuals within single states.' As
the state system matured the absolutist conception of sovereignty came to
predominate, removing citizen consent to governmental rule as a concern of
international law.'
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1910). Likewise in 1923 William Howard Taft, in the famous 7inoco
arbitration, held that "non-recognition [of governments] on the ground of illegitimacy of origin was not
a postulate of international law and did not secure general acquiescence." Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1923-
24 ANN. Dia. PUB. INT'L L. CAs. 34, 37 (1923).
44 Such an absolutist notion of sovereignty is often associated with the writings of Jean Bodin. See
J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 7-12 (6th ed. 1963).
45 This formulation is broad enough to describe a wide range of liberal political theorists and so
glosses over ambiguities that an exclusively philosophical analysis would address in full. For example, to
say that popular consent legitimizes government does not necessarily require a system of ongoing majority
rule. Consent in perpetuity might have been given when the political community was established. This
arrangement describes the Hobbesian social contract. Even if one concludes that popular sovereignty
requires majoritarianism, the people may elect anti-democratic leaders who promise (or simply act) to end
all future elections. If the people choose such leaders freely, can the new regime claim legitimacy based
on a popular mandate? Further, even the term "popular sovereignty" begs the question of who constitutes
"the people." In describing various forms of a democracy Aristotle spoke of systems in which access to
office is controlled by a property assessment, and those where office-holding is denied to those who "fail
to pass a scrutiny as to birth." ARISTOTLE, TiE POLITICS bk. iv, ch. iv (T.A. Sinclair trans., 1962).
Finally, many societies have restricted the scope of popular sovereignty by establishing a set of fundamental
rights held to be immune from infringement by political institutions. Such counter-majoritarian rights arise
from notions of inherent human dignity and autonomy. If a society recognizes a sufficient number of these
rights, or if they repeatedly function to trump the majority will on particularly contentious issues, the
following question arises: is popular sovereignty still the fundamental organizing principle of the society
or has it been replaced, in whole or in part, by the principles of individualism undergirding the protected
rights? See generally Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893 (arguing
that protection of key individual rights, not majoritarianism, is defining principle of U.S. political system).
46 Advocates of democratic reforms in the nineteenth Century offered two primary justifications for
the theory of popular sovereignty. First, by offering individuals complete freedom of choice in ordering
their society, popular government maximizes individual satisfactions or wants. Second, popular government
allows for the fullest possible exercise of individuals' inherent human capacity for creativity and rational
judgment and thought. See C.B. MACPmRSON, DEmOCRATIC TnEORY: ESSAYS IN RETaREvAL 4-5 (1973).
Robert Dahl has argued for a thirdjustificationbased on the inherent equality of all persons and, as a result,
the presumption that each is the best judge of her own interests. ROBERT A. DAML, DEMOCRAcY AND ITS
CRITIcS 108 (1989).
47 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203, cmt.
e (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT) ("'i]nternational law does notgenerally address domestic constitutional
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Yet while popular sovereignty never emerged as a rule among states, it has
lived on in the West and, over time, elsewhere, as the most enduring theory
of domestic political legitimacy." As long as international law did not purport
to regulate the process of choosing national governments, popular sovereignty
and statism could coexist without contradiction in their respective domains of
authority. When the United Nations began codifying a list of basic human
rights in the late 1940s, however, popular sovereignty emerged as the justifica-
tion for the human right to participate in government. Article 21 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, provides that "the will of the
people shall be the basis of the authority of government. "49 With concern for
domestic legitimacy thus elevated to the international plane, an acute tension
developed within international law between absolutist and popular notions of
sovereignty. Was international law suddenly to deny recognition to undemo-
cratic regimes, or impose other types of sanctions, when it had for so long
served to protect all regimes from external pressures? On the other hand, if
the people are indeed sovereign, could the law countenance interaction with
regimes that deny the people their sovereign rights?
Few international scholars have confronted this tension. Many still write
of an immoveable wall between domestic and international notions of govern-
mental legitimacy.50 For example, Michael Walzer has vigorously defended
the idea that "states can be presumptively legitimate in international society
and actually legitimate at home. "51 He argues that most forms of domestic
tyranny give rise only to the right of citizen rebellion, as citizens are the only
aggrieved right-holders under social contract theory. 52 By contrast, outside
intervention, even if it is pro-democratic, violates citizens' rights by artificially
accelerating their "'aversion"' to a tyrannical government.53 While Walzer
is writing primarily about forceful humanitarian intervention, his argument can
issues, such as how a national government is formed").
48 See PATRICK RILEY, WILL AND POLITCAL LEGrIMACY 1 (1982).
49 See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 21 (providing that "the will of the people shall
be the basis of the authority of government").
50 David Held, for example, states:
The central problem facing liberal and liberal democratic theory concerned the relationship
between the state, as an independent authority with supreme right to declare and administer law
over a given territory, and the individual, with a right and interest to determine the nature and
limits of the state's authority. In short, the question was: how should the 'sovereign state' be
related to the 'sovereign people' who were in principle the source of its powers?
DAVID HELD, PoLricAL THEORY AND THE MODERN STATE 48 (1989).
51 Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
209, 214 (1980).
52 Walzer allows for exceptions, permitting humanitarian intervention in cases where a national
minority is attempting to secede, where a foreign power has intervened in a civil war, or where a state
is massacring, enslaving or expelling large numbers of people. Id. at 216-18. Walzer argues that only in
these instances is the lack of "'fit'" between the government and the community "radically apparent." L
at 214.
53 Id. at 215.
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be read to apply with equal force to non-forcible measures (such as a norm
of political participation) designed to "undemocratic" regimes.54 In Walzer's
view, international legitimacy serves not the democratic value of individual
choice but the "pluralist" value of respecting the process of organic political
change on the national level. Hence, "foreign officials must act as if [tyrannical
states] were legitimate. "'
As the sections below will suggest, international law has only begun to
grapple with this problem. Indeed, the existence of the problem itself demon-
strates progress: until recently, participatory rights were considered so ill-
defined that they posed little threat to traditional forms of sovereignty. The
post-Cold-War era has brought these rights into sharper focus, and the nature
of the legal obligation to provide citizen participation has become clear.
B. The Nature and Scope of Post-War Treaty-Based Participatory Rights
Post-World War II human rights conventions guarantee the right to political
participation primarily by requiring signatories to hold fair elections at regular
intervals. The United Nations also began to monitor elections and plebiscites
regularly in colonial territories and newly independent states. Developing
interpretations of these conventions, as informed by the practice of electoral
monitoring, suggest that the right to political participation is now established
as a matter of treaty law.
This article argues that the right to political participation is binding upon
the signatories of these conventions and treaties. Further, the right is coherent
as it is derived from concrete treaty language and the standards developed by
international election monitors, and it is enforceable through treaty and non-
treaty mechanisms. The treaties suggest that a free and fair election must, at
a minimum, satisfy several criteria: elections must be by universal and equal
suffrage, by secret ballot, at reasonable, periodic intervals, and may not
evidence discrimination against voters or candidates. The following sections
will elaborate upon these criteria.
54 Other examples would include foreign financing of opposition political parties, economic boycotts
and embargoes, suspension of diplomatic relations, etc. Walzer's emphasis on the primacy of local political
communities would seem to exclude such external efforts to enforce participatory rights since they, like
humanitarian intervention, represent efforts to destroy the very entities which give rise to shared conceptions
of rights. Id. at 226-28.
55 Id. at 216 (emphasis added). For responses to Walzer, see Charles R. Beitz, Nonintervention and
Communal Integrity, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 385 (1980); David Luban, The Romance of the Nation-State,
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1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Political Cove-
nant), which came into force in 1976,56 is the most widely subscribed treaty
guaranteeing participatory rights; as of January 1992, 105 states were party
to the Political Covenant.57 Article 25 is the principal provision on political
rights in the Covenant,5" and contains three principal guarantees: non-discrim-
ination, the right to participate in public affairs, and the right to free elec-
tions. 59
a. Non-Discrimination
Article 25 initially states that the rights it provides shall be enjoyed "with-
out any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 of this Covenant and without
56 The General Assembly originally passed the Political Covenant in 1966. See G.A. Res. 2200 (XX1),
U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 55, U.N. Doe. A16316 (1966). Article 49 of the Covenant
provided that the agreement would come into force three months after the 35th instrument of ratification
was deposited with the Secretary-General. Id. art 49.
57 UNITED NATIONS, MULT.ATERALTREATIES DEPOSITED WITHTHE SECRETARY-GENERAL, STATUS
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1991, U.N. Doe. ST/LEGISER.E/IO (1992) [hereinafter MULTiLATERAL TREATIES]
(listing 100 state parties). Drafting the Covenant took eighteen years, a process that involved arduous
negotiations between capitalist and socialist states. The parties to the Political Covenant now include a
substantiatnumber of developing countries from all continents. SUPPLEMENTTO MULTILATERALTREATIES,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/10 (Supp. 1992) (noting recent accession by Angola, Benin, Brazil, Cote
d'Ivoire, and Latvia).
58 See supra note 6 (quoting text of Article 25). Other articles of the Political Covenant are also
relevant to a citizen's participatory rights, such as those guaranteeing the right to hold opinions (art. 19),
the right to peaceful assembly (art. 21), the right to freedom of association (art. 22), the right to freedom
from discrimination (art. 24), and the right to equality before the law (art. 26). In addition, Professor
Cassese has argued that the right to self-determination (art. 1) has an internal component that should be
understood as providing an individual right to participate in national affairs. See Antonio Cassese, Political
Self-Determination-Old Concepts and New Developments, in UN LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 137
(Antonio Cassese ed., 1979). This article does not address the scope or substance of these other provisions.
59 This article shall not consider subsection (c), which concerns equal access to public service. It is,
in effect, a specialized non-discrimination clause.
Unlike other Covenant provisions, Article 25 addresses the rights of "citizens," rather than "persons"
or "individuals." The significance of this distinction is not clear. Use of the word "citizen" limits an
individual to participation only in the government of her own state, rather than those of all states or the
state of her choice. Reference to "citizens" also shifts the justification for the right away from principles
of individual dignity or autonomy to the process of interaction between individuals and their govern-
ments-the relationship that gives rise to the status of "citizen." See ANDREW VINCENT, THEORIES OF THE
STATE 106-09 (1987). Neither the Covenant nor its travawc explicitly discuss restrictions on states'
discretion in defining and granting citizenship. Since general international law does not regulate the granting
of citizenship, see Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Gnat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6) (stating that "international
law leaves it to each State to lay down the rules governing the grant of its own nationality'), the omission
of such criteria from the Political Covenant implies a deliberate decision to allow this discretion to continue.
A potential for abuse therefore exists: Kuwait, for example, currently denies citizenship to hundreds of
thousands of Palestinian guest workers, even though their families may have lived in the country for
generations. See Kuwait: Freed But Not Free, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1992, at C6. Article 25 does not
guarantee the right of these workers to participate in Kuwaiti politics because they are not Kuwaiti citizens.
Since Article 25 contains no provisions on absentee ballots, these workers may also lack the right to
participate in the elections of any other state of which they are citizens.
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unreasonable restrictions."6' Article 2 forbids any restrictions that discrimi-
nate against citizens on the basis of an explicitly prohibited characteristic.
1
The phrase "without unreasonable restrictions" implies that some restrictions
on participation not based on prohibited distinctions are "reasonable" and
therefore permissible. The delegates included this phrase to allow denial of
suffrage to minors, convicts, the mentally ill, and those not meeting residency
requirements, and to permit the existence of certain limitations on the right to
hold public office, such as a requirement of professional training.62 The
delegates apparently did not consider such "reasonable" restrictions "discrimi-
natory,"63 but did not intend the standard of reasonableness to sanction the
egregious forms of discrimination set out in Article 2." While Article 25's
60 See supra note 6 (quoting text of Article 25).
61 Article 2 provides that all rights shall be respected "without distinction of any kind." Explicitly
prohibited distinctions include "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status." Political Covenant, supra note 6, art. 2.
62 See U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 16th Sess., 1097th mtg, at 105, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1097 (1961);
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 16th Sess., 1096th mtg. at 179, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR1096 (1961) [hereinafter
Third Committee, 1096th Meeting]; Summary Record of the 365th Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Commission on
Human Rights, 9th Sess., 365th mtg. at 5, 15-16, U.N. Doc. EICN.41SR.365 (1953) [hereinafter
Commission on Human Rights, 365th Meeting]; Summary Record of the 364th Meeting, U.N. ESCOR
Commission on Human Rights, 9th Sess., 364th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.364 (1953) [hereinafter
Commission on Human Rights, 364th Meeting]; Summary Record of the 363d Meeting, U.N. ESCOR
Commission on Human Rights, 9th Sess., 363d mtg. at 12, 15, 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.363 (1953)
[hereinafter Commission on Human Rights, 363d Meeting].
The Soviets proposed that property, educational, "or other qualifications restricting the participation
of citizens in voting" be abolished as an alternative to this "limitations clause." See UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COuNCIL, COMMIssION ON HUMAN RIGrS, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICs: INSERTION OF A NEW ARTICLE IN THE DRAFT COVENANT OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTs,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.221, at 1 (1953). This proposal was rejected. SummaryRecord ofthe 367th Meeting,
U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 9th Sess., 367th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. EICN.41SR.367
(1953) [hereinafter Commission on Human Rights, 367th Meeting].
63 See Commission on Human Rights, 363d Meeting, supra note 62, at 16 (statement of Mr.
Jevremovic, Yugoslavian delegate) (describing restrictions such as those based on mental deficiency as
"reasons of a non-discriminatory character"); Commission on Human Rights, 365th Meeting, supra note
62, at 13 (statement of Mr. Cassin, French delegate) (similar).
64 See Annotation by Secretary-General ofthe Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, U.N.
GAOR, 10th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc A/2929 (1955) [hereinafterAnnotation by Secretary-General].
The Annotation states:
While it was considered necessary to prohibit restrictions which amounted to discrimination, it
was observed that in most countries the right to vote was denied to certain categories of persons,
such as minors and lunatics, and that the right to be elected to public office and the right of
access to public service were generally subjected to certain restrictions.
ILd. at 174. The Human Rights Commission also considered a Soviet proposal to enumerate specific grounds
for discrimination in Article 25. The Soviet list, however, did not coincide with the examples given in
Article 2 and (as a number of delegates pointed out) would have therefore created inconsistent obligations.
See Commission on Human Rights, 363d Meeting, supra note 62, at 10 (statement of Mr. Whitlam,
Australian delegate); Commission on Human Rights, 365th Meeting, supra note 62, at 4 (statement of Mr.
Hoare, U.K. delegate); id. at 10 (statement of Mrs. Rossel, Swedish delegate). The Soviet list also failed
to prohibit discrimination based on political opinion. As the Uruguayan delegate noted, if this omission
permitted political discrimination "the ruling party in every totalitarian State would continue to enjoy a
monopoly of government." Commission on Human Rights, 363d Meeting, supra note 62, at 8 (statement
of Mr. Perotti, Uruguayan delegate). The Commission first voted to amend the Soviet draft to include
political discrimination, but ultimately rejected the idea of a separate list altogether in favor of a reference
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non-discrimination language is directed explicitly at individuals, it may also
be read to prohibit states from discriminating against political parties embrac-
ing a particular ideology, a proposition endorsed by a U.N. study prior to the
Covenant's coming into force."
b. The Right to Take Part in Public Affairs
Paragraph (a) of Article 25 guarantees the right to "take part in the conduct
of public affairs directly or through freely chosen representatives."" Since
paragraph (b) requires genuine, periodic elections, paragraph (a) must contem-
plate additional means of influencing public policy. 7 However, paragraph
(a) does not identify the types of public bodies to which it applies, and the
delegates rejected a proposal that would have applied to "all organs of authori-
ty."68 Thus, below the primary leadership level (e.g., the head of state and
the legislature), Article 25(a) is satisfied if appointed officials are "in some
way responsible to elected officials.""'
c. Requirements Concerning Elections
Although it presents some of the most difficult interpretative questions in
Article 25, the drafters spent little time discussing the central terms of para-
graph (b), which guarantees the right to vote "at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
to Article 2. Commission on Human Rights, 367th Meeting, supra note 62, at 11, 12. Article 2 generally
prohibits all discrimination based on "political or other opinion."
65 See HERNAN SANTA CRUZ, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF POLTICAL RIGHTS,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/213/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. 63.XIV.2 (1962). Mr. Santa Cruz noted:
Political opinion is frequently expressed by political parties and organizations sponsoring certain
ideas of government or maintaining certain political principles or beliefs. Discrimination on the
ground of political opinion is therefore directed not only against individuals, but against political
parties and organizations as such. The most drastic type of discrimination in this sphere, found
in some countries, consists of the total suppression of all political parties and organizations. While
clearly discriminatory, such action has been explained in most cases as a temporary emergency
measure, necessary to the survival and growth of the State. However, in some notable instances
it has become a permanent arrangement reflecting the philosophy of the Government, and
therefore a persistent form of discrimination directed against almost all the nationals of that
country.
Id. at 37.
66 Political Covenant, supra note 6, art. 25(a).
67 These might include local school boards, town meetings, or advocacy groups. A broader definition
of "public affairs" might require open participation in political parties, particularly in systems of non-
proportional representation where a few parties effectively monopolize access to political power. Broader
still, and depending on a state's social structure, paragraph (a) might be read to encompass participation
in labor unions, the officer corps of the military, or other institutions wielding influence over policy.
68 See Annotation by Secretary-General, supra note 64, at 173.
69 Partsch, supra note 14, at 239.
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ballot, guarantee[ing] the free expression of the will of the electors."70 The
delegates generally agreed that the requirements of universal and equal suffrage
and a secret ballot meant that each vote must count equally. 71 However, the
delegates left to individual states the question whether votes would have equal
effect, to be determined in part by whether a country followed a proportional
representation or a simple majority electoral system.' 2 The delegates also
briefly discussed whether ballot secrecy was appropriate for states with a high
percentage of illiterate voters,73 and the majority concluded that ballot secrecy
was a fundamental aspect of a fair election and should be retained.74
The delegates failed to clarify whether the guarantee of a "genuine elec-
tion" to establish "the free expression of the will of the electors" requires party
pluralism. While western states have long maintained that single-party elections
are incompatible with genuine choice, socialist states did not share this
view.7' Since these states ratified the Political Covenant, however, they must
have concluded that Article 25 did not preclude single party systems .76 Sever-
al African leaders (most prominently Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere)
argued in the 1960s that the existence of multiple political parties was not a
70 Political Covenant, supra note 6, art. 25(b). See Annotation by Secretary-General, supra note 64,
at 173 (reviewing drafting history).
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights, 364th Meeting, supra note 62, at 8, 15 (statement of Mr.
Cassin, French delegate). Debates on participatory rights often overlook the fact that the Covenant does
not prescribe a particular type of electoral system. The travaux demonstrate that states may choose from
any type of electoral system as long as it meets the minimum fairness criteria set out in Article 25. See
generally MIcHEL L. BALINSKI & H. PEYTON YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION: MEETING TiE IDEAL OF
ONE MAN, ONE VOTr 87-90 (1982) (discussing relative merits of parliamentary, presidential, and other
types of electoral systems).
73 See Summary Records ofMeetings of3d Committee, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 132d mtg.
at 450, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.132 (1948) [hereinafter Third Committee, 132d Meeting] (statement of Mr.
Saint-Lot, Haitian delegate); id. at 455 (statement of Mr. Garcia Bauer, Guatemalan delegate). The
Universal Declaration provides for a secret ballot "or equivalent free voting procedures." Universal
Declaration, supra note6, art. 21(3). The quoted language was not retained in the Political Covenant, thus
establishing secret balloting as the sole legitimate method of voting.
74 See Third Committee, 132d Meeting, supra note 73, at 450 (statement of Mr. Sandifer, U.S.
delegate); id. at 459 (statement of Mr. Watt, Australian delegate); id. at 463 (statement of Mr. Pavlov,
Soviet delegate). The Soviet delegate pointed out that illiterates might be helped by neighbors or friends
in filling out their ballots with only minimal cost to ballot secrecy. Id. at 463. In the Third Committee,
only two states (Haiti and Guatemala) voted against including a provision for a secret ballot in the Universal
Declaration. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 134th mtg. at 471 (1948) [hereinafter Third Committee,
134th Meeting]. Ballot secrecy recently became an volatile issue in Senegal, for example, which is in the
process of redrafting its electoral code. See NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRs, AN ASSESsMENT OF THE SENEGALESE ELECTORAL CODE 33-34 (1991).
75 For example, the Soviet delegate argued that "in his country, the bourgeois class had ceased to
exist. There thus remained only workers and peasants, and the Communist Party by itself was capable of
looking after their interests." hird Committee, 134th Meeting, supra note 74, at 471, (statement of Mr.
Pavlov, Soviet delegate). He argued further that "[u]nder the prevailing system [in the Soviet Union], there
was no justification for the creation of other parties.' Id. These statements occurred during the debate over
the Universal Declaration.
76 Steiner, supra note 14, at 93.
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prerequisite to genuine electoral choice.77 Others argued that permitting
multiple parties would bring violence and perhaps civil war to states in which
colonial-era boundaries had led to rampant tribal conflict. 78 Some Africans
also asked whether the U.S. or British systems, which effectively cap the
number of political parties at two or three, provide genuine choice,79 and
pointed to slavery, poll taxes, and property franchise requirements to question
whether party pluralism alone guarantees genuine choice for all citizens.'
The Political Covenant's travauxprepatoires barely address this issue. The
Human Rights and Third Committees spent little time debating the meaning
of the term "genuine," and did not discuss the specific question of party plural-
ism. The only attempt to define a "genuine" election came late in the drafting
process, when the Chilean delegate stated that "[tihe adjective 'genuine' had
been used to guarantee that all elections of every kind faithfully reflected the
opinion of the population and to protect the electors against government
pressure and fraud. "81 The text itself supports this interpretation. A parenthet-
ical clause providing for universal and equal suffrage and secret ballot, and
the phrase "guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors" follow
the requirement of "genuine periodic elections." The latter phrase appears to
be describing the first: that is, a "genuine periodic" election is one which
guarantees the will of the electors, freely expressed. On this view, if the
77 See, e.g., JULUS K. NYERERE, DEMOCRACY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM (1962); see also HUMAN
RIaHTS IN A ONE-PARTY STATE (International Comm'n of Jurists ed. 1978); Yougindra Khushalani, Human
Rights in Africa and Asia, 4 HUM. RTS. L.J. 403, 417 (1983); Simbi V. Mubako, Zambia's Single-Party
Constitution-A Search for Unity and Development, 5 ZAMBIA L.J. 67, 80-83 (1973). For a more recent
view, see THE ONE PARTY STATE AND DEMOCRACY: THE ZIMBABWE DEBATE (Ibbo Mandaza & Lloyd
Sachikonye eds., 1991).
78 See, e.g., Pius Msekwa, The Doctrine of the One-Party State in Relation to Human Rights and
the Rule of Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE-PARTY STATE, supra note 77, at 22, 22-23. Togo, for
example, defended its one-party system in response to queries from the U.N. Human Rights Committee
as follows:
[P]luralism which had been instituted at the time of independence had rapidly degenerated, giving
rise to a plethora of parties based on ethnic units, each serving its own interests. This had
engendered a civil war mentality. The Togolese People's Rally had proved to be the best means
of achieving national unity and solidarity. The concept of 'rally' implied respect for the individual
and for diversity of opinions, the single Party being a forum where citizens could engage in
dialogue and freely express their points of view.
Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 60-61, U.N. Doc.
A/44140 (1989) [hereinafterReportto 44th Session]; see also Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990) thereinafter Report to 45th Session]
(statement of Zairian delegate) ("The limitation to three political parties had been chosen to avoid the
repetition of the tragic experience of the years 1960-1965 when unrestricted multipartism caused serious
difficulties and involved the death of more than half a million people.').
79 See, e.g., Mubako, supra note 77, at 82.
80 bbo Mandaza & Lloyd Sachikonye, The Zimbabwe Debate on the One-Party State andDemocracy,
in THE ONE PARTY STATE AND DEMOCRACY: THE ZIMBABWE DEBATE, supra note 77, at 1, 3-4.
81 Third Committee, 1096th Meeting, supra note 62, at 180.
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electorate did not have the opportunity to express its opinion by casting a vote
for a particular candidate or party2 the election would not be "genuine. ""
This interpretation suggests that Article 25 does not prohibit one-party
states per se. Single party elections would run afoul of the Chilean formula
only if public opinion in a state were actually divided on important political
issues and if the single party did not permit candidates representing each
faction to stand for election. A single party of homogeneous views would
accurately reflect the "free expression of the will of the electors" if there were
no divisions in public opinion. Similarly, if divisions did exist but the various
factions within a party gave voice to all major points of view, additional parties
would be unnecessary." A state imposing an ideological orthodoxy on party
members and prohibiting all political activity outside the party certainly would
not meet the test of genuineness. The Chilean formula represents a compromise
between the views of the U.S. and Soviet camps. Indeed, the very lack of
debate over party pluralism suggests that these camps decided not to press their
views, recognizing that neither was likely to prevail in pure form. 5 As a
result, the Political Covenant sidestepped the issue of party pluralism and
instead required that any electoral system meet standards of genuineness and
accuracy in actual practice.
The U.N. Human Rights Committee, which reviews parties' adherence to
the Political Covenant, 6 has consistently expressed skepticism that "genuine"
82 The word "opportunity" is important because the drafters did not attempt to mandate proportional
representation. See Draft International Covenants on Hunan Rights, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 16th Sess.,
1018th plen. mtg., Annex I, Agenda Item 35, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/5000 (1961); Third Committee, 1096th
Meeting, supra note 62, at 179.
83 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for example, has concluded that an "authentic
election" occurs when there exists "some consistency between the will of the voters and the result of the
election." Mexico Elections Decision, Cases 9768, 9780, 9828, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 97, 108, OEA/ser.
LI/ll.77, doc. 7, rev. 1 (1990). The Commission based this opinion upon the American Convention on
Human Rights, whose provisions on participatory rights it has described as "fundamentally coincid[ing]"
with Article 25 of the Political Covenant. Id. at 107.
84 The delegate from Cameroon stated in a 1989 General Assembly debate that "[i]n his own country,
all the different political parties had opted to form a single entity in an attempt to remove bitter divisions
caused by the old system. Although all candidates for election were members of the same party, the system
was democratic because it provided for a free choice of those who were to govern." Summary Record of
the 54th Meeting, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 44th Sess., 54th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. AIC.31441SR.54
(1989) (statement of Mr. Engo). In February 1990 police arrested the former President of the Cameroon
Bar Association and his supporters for attempting to form an opposition party. By June of that year the
President of Cameroon announced his commitment to a multiparty system. See FREEDOM HousE, supra
note 5, at 108-09.
85 See Partsch, supra note 14, at 240 (describing Chilean delegate's remark as a "very diplomatic
formulation [which] avoided any allusion to a choice between at least two parties or to opposition against
the government").
86 The Human Rights Committee is generally considered to be an authoritative interpreter of the
Political Covenant, despite the fact that it is not explicitly so designated by the document. See TIEODOR
MERON, HUMAN RiGHTS LAW-MAXING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 85-86 (1986).
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one-party elections are possible.87 However, it has yet to address the issue
directly in an individual petition s or a general comment on Article 25. The
recent fall of one-party states in Africa, 9 Eastern Europe,' and Latin Amer-
ica9' has softened debate on this issue, and the principle of multiparty elec-
tions appears to have gained widespread support.' This growing unanimity
87 Article 40 of the Political Covenant requires state parties to report to the Human Rights Committee
the steps they have taken to implement the Political Covenant. Political Covenant, supra note 6, art. 40.
Upon receipt of a report the Human Rights Committee usually questions delegates as to whether their state
permits opposition parties, the extent to which those parties are allowed to operate freely, and whether any
parties have been banned. See, e.g., Report to 45th Session, supra note 78, at 13 (Yemen); id, at 38 (Portu-
gal); id. at 47 (Chile); id. at 52 (Argentina); id. at 95 (Nicaragua); id. at 104 (Vietnam); Report to 44th
Session, supra note 78, at 28 (Mexico); id. at 57, 61 (Togo); Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/42140 (1987) (Poland); id. at 38 (Tunisia); id at
57 (Senegal). For example, the Vietnamese delegate was questioned about "the leading role of the Commu-
nist Party and the compatibility of this situation with respect for the political rights protected by the
Covenant." Report to 45th Session, supra note 78, at 104. And responding to a report by Zaire, Committee
members "welcomed the constitutional reform abolishing the one-party system in the country." Id. at 128.
The Committee's inquiries suggest that it presumes one-party states are incompatible with Article 25,
although it will solicit evidence to the contrary. State parties appear to recognize this presumption: of the
states cited above, only Togo answered the Committee's inquiries by defending the principle of one-party
rule. Report to 44th Session, supra note 78, at 60-61.
88 State parties have the option of permitting their citizens to bring claims directly to the Human
Rights Committee. Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
89 See Gus Constantine, Cameroon Leader Sees End of African One-Party Rule, WASH. TIMwES, May
8, 1991, at A8; Togo's President Agrees to Yield Power to a Rival, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1991, at A13;
see generally Catherine Bond, AfricanDictators Bow to PressureforReform, DAmY TELEGRAH (London),
Apr. 25, 1991, at 10; Kenneth B. Noble, Despots Dwindle as Reform Alters Face of Africa, N.Y. TIME,
Apr. 13, 1991, at Al; A Fresh Wind in Africa, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 1990, at A28; Makau-wa Mutua,
African Renaissance, N.Y. TIMS, May 11, 1991, at A23.
90 See generally TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE MAGIC LArrNTERN (1990) (discussing 1989 as a year
of changes in various Eastern European nations).
91 See Falcoff, supra note 1, at 65.
92 For example, in June 1990 each of the former eastern bloc states signed the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Copenhagen Document, in which they agreed to provide "a clear
separation between the State and political parties." Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference
on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, June 29, 1990,
5.4, 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1308 [hereinafter Copenhagen Document]; see generally Thomas Buergenthal, The
Copenhagen CSCE Meeting: A New Public Orderfor Europe, 11 HuM. RTS. L.J. 217, 232 (1990). They
further agreed:
[To] respect the right of individuals and groups to establish, in full freedom, their own political
parties or other political organizations and provide such political parties and organizations with
necessary legal guarantees to enable them to compete with each other on a basis of equal
treatment before the law and by the authorities.
Copenhagen Document, supra note 92, 7.6, 29 1.L.M. at 1310. Although the Copenhagen Document
does not legally bind its signatories, the breadth of its language and the emerging European consensus on
human rights which it embodies have led Professor Buergenthal to describe it as "a document which, in
its political scope and significance, is unmatched by other international human rights instruments."
Buergenthal, supra note 92, at 231. The same states executed the CSCE Charter of Paris in November
1990. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21,
1990, 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991) [hereinafter Charter of Paris]. The Charter does not explicitly discuss political
parties, but it wholeheartedly embraces a western conception of democracy:
[The state parties] undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system
of government of our nations ... Democratic government is based on the will of the people,
expressed regularly through free and fair elections. Democracy has as its foundation respect for
the human person and the rule of law. Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of expression,
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among parties to the Political Covenant suggests that a conflict between
original and contemporary understandings of what constitutes a "genuine"
election may never arise.
It would be a mistake, however, to end the search for interpretative
guidance on the issue of party pluralism here. The other major source of
participatory norms-U.N. election monitoring missions-has uniformly
regarded party pluralism as essential to genuine elections. In Part III, this
article argues that the standards developed by U.N. election monitors can be
used to clarify the meaning of Article 25 and to help determine the legal status
of one-party elections. Although the Political Covenant does not clearly require
multi-party elections, the emerging law of participatory rights does not permit
single-party elections.
2. The First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Right contains no provisions on
participatory rights. However, Article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention
provides: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the
free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature." 93
Thus Article 3 is substantially narrower in scope than Article 25 of the Politi-
cal Covenant, as Article 3 does not require universal suffrage or "genuine"
elections, does not prohibit discrimination, and does not mention equal access
to public service. Finally, Article 3 does not discuss political participation as
an individual right, and therefore it does not appear to grant standing to
individuals.
The European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights
generally have disregarded these literal shortcomings, however, and have
interpreted Article 3 to provide guarantees substantially similar to those
contained in the Political Covenant. They have done so by viewing the Proto-
col's language through the lens of the European countries' common democratic
heritage.94 The assumption of political homogeneity indicates a profound
tolerance of all groups of society, and equality of opportunity for each person.
lId, 30 I.L.M. at 193-94. For further discussion of the Charter and the Copenhagen Document, see ilfra
notes 152-162 and accompanying text.
93 European Protocol, supra note 6, art. 3. The First Protocol entered into force on May 18, 1954,
and the following states are parties: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom. 1985 Y.B. of Eur. Cony. H.R. 17. See generally P. VAN DIYK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (2d ed. 1990).
94 For example, the European Commission of Human Rights has held that Article 3 "presupposes
the existence of a representative legislature, elected at reasonable intervals, as the basis of a democratic
society." Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 179 (Eur. Comm'n of H.R.). The Commission,
rejecting an argument that the Protocol requires proportional rather than majority representation, noted that
both systems existed at the time the Convention was signed and that "Ib]oth these forms of elections may
Vol. 17:539, 1992
The Right to Political Participation
difference between the methods used to interpret the European Protocol and
the Political Covenant. Unlike the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which
rarely ventures beyond treaty language in its decisions on participatory rights,
European tribunals have adduced extra-textual participatory rights to reflect
the common expectations of the parties to the European Convention.9'
Article 3 of the Protocol applies to elections for "the legislature."' Thus,
the Commission has held that Article 3 does not apply to Belgian Regional
Councils which, under the Belgian constitution, exercise no legislative pow-
er.9 7 Similarly, Article 3 does not apply to a body which only exercises
legislative power delegated by a superior body or to a body whose power
concerns only a small group of people.9" As a general rule, the European
Court has held that the nature of legislative power must "be interpreted in the
light of the constitutional structure of the State in question," and therefore a
"legislature" may mean more than just the national parliament.99 Although
neither the Court nor the Commission has considered whether Article 3 applies
to the election of a president who is not a member of parliament, it is unlikely
they would construe "legislature" to refer to a single individual." °
a. Rights Concerning Elections
Article 3 requires the parties to hold "free elections at reasonable intervals
by secret ballot under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the
opinion of the people."1"1 This language appears to impose a duty on states
be considered as a part of the common heritage of political traditions to which reference can be found in
the Convention's Preamble." X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7140/75, 7 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 95, 97 (1977). More recently the European Court of Human Rights upheld this principle by stating
that Article 3 "enshrines a characteristic principle of democracy." Mathieu-Mohin v. Belgium, 113 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1987).
95 Regional human rights enforcement is more effective in some respects than global attempts, because
regional treaties are more likely to reflect shared normative expectations, heightening compliance by
member states. However, not all regional human rights treaties provide the same degree of protection of
participatory rights as the European Convention: the standards contained in the African Charter, for
example, are significantly weaker. See infra notes 147-149 and accompanying text. If universal concepts
of equal worth and dignity of all persons support political and human rights, it is difficult to justify
excluding some regions of the world from high standards presumably applicable to all. Indeed, persons
living in such regions would be most in need of the protections provided by the Political Covenant.
96 European Protocol, supra note 6, art. 3.
97 W. v. Belgium, App. No. 6745/74, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 110, 116 (1975).
Therefore, a body which can propose bills but not enact them also is not a "legislature." See VAN DUK
& VAN HooF, supra note 93, at 486.
98 X. v. The Netherlands, App. No. 9926/82, 32 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 274, 281 (1983);
X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5155/71, 6 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 13, 13 (1976).
99 Mathieu-Mohin, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23.
100 See VAN DIIK & VAN HOOF, supra note 93, at 486 (arguing that Article 3 would not apply to
election of president even if constitution required president's assent to bills passed by elected body).
101 European Protocol, supra note 6, art. 3.
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rather than bestow a right on individuals."°2 However, both the Commission
and the Court have found an implicit guarantee of individual rights in the
Protocol. 1"a This interpretative leap has quite practical roots: denying stand-
ing of all voters and candidates to bring claims under Article 3 would limit
claims to claims against other states under Article 24.104 The Court has
drawn on a number of sources0 5 to conclude that Article 3 protects "subjec-
tive rights of participation-the 'right to vote' and the 'right to stand for
election to the legislature.""'
Neither of these rights is unconditional. The Court recently announced a
multi-faceted test to evaluate limitations on political rights: "[C]onditions
[cannot] curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very
essence and deprive them of their effectiveness .... In particular, such
conditions must not thwart 'the free expression of the opinion of the people
in the choice of the legislature."' The "free expression" requirement, the
Court explained, "implies essentially-apart from freedom of expression
(already protected under article 10 of the Convention)-the principle of equality
102 As a report of the Council of Europe stated in 1968:
[Article 3] does not guarantee that the individual shall enjoy a certain right .... The individual
as citizen has at most the 'right' to expect the Contracting States to hold such elections, thus
fulfilling the obligation assumed when ratifying the European Convention. But he can on no
account deduce from the actual wording of the clause his own right to vote or his right as a
citizen to take part in such elections.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, REPORT OF THE CoUNcIL OF EUROPE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, 1968, § 5 (1968).
103 Mathieu-Mohin, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22-23 (1985). W. v. Belgium, 2 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 116.
104 Article 24 of the European Convention permits states to bring complaints concerning the practices
of other state parties. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, art. 24, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. However,
no state has brought such a claim under Article 3 of the First Protocol.
105 For example, the Court noted the relevance of the Preamble to the First Protocol, which ensures
"the collective enforcement of certain rights andfeedoms other than those" originally included in the
Convention. European Protocol, supra note 6, pmbl. (emphasis added). As the Court also noted, Article
5 provides that the articles of the Protocol, including Article 3, "shall be regarded as additional Articles
to the Convention," while the Preamble to the Fourth Protocol explicitly refers to the "rights and freedoms"
protected in 'Articles 1 to 3" of the First Protocol. Protocol (No. 4) to the European Convention on Human
Rights, open for signature Sept. 16, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 46. Finally, the Court in Mathieu-Mohin noted
the repeated references to "political rights," the "right to free elections," and similar formulations in the
travauxprepatoires for the First Protocol as evidence of the importance of these rights in the European
system. 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22-23.
106 Mathieu-Mohin, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22. The difficulty of reconciling this holding with
the plain language of Article 3 became evident in the Commission's 1981 decision in Liberal Party v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 8765/79, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 211 (1980). The Commission
first stated that Article 3 guarantees *the right to vote and the right to stand for election to the legislature."
Id. at 220 (emphasis added). It then stated that Article 3 "obliges the Government to hold free elections."
Id. at 223 (emphasis added), but then reverts to its first reading: "Article 3 of the First Protocol gives an
individual right to vote in the election provided for by this article." Id. at 224 (emphasis added). The actual
language of Article 3 does not support the interpretation that it contains both a right and a duty.
107 Mathieu-Mohin, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23.
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of treatment of all citizens in the exercise of their right to vote and their right
to stand for election."108
However, the Commission has held that states may restrict the rights to
vote and to stand for election as long as the limitations are not arbitrary and
do not infringe upon the free expression of opinion. "° In contrast to the
U.N. Human Rights Committee, the Commission held explicitly in 1969 that
the abolition of political parties violated Article 3.'° Convicted prisoners
serving jail sentences may be disqualified from voting,"' as can imprisoned
conscientious objectors,"' and the Commission has upheld various residency
requirements."' In interpreting the right to stand for election, the Commis-
sion has upheld state subsidies to parties that attain a certain percentage of the
vote," 4 minimum signature requirements for a party to appear on a bal-
lot," 5 and prohibitions against members of one legislative body standing for
election to another. 116 The Commission also seems to follow an unexpressed
de minimis rule: laws such as those excluding parties unable to muster 500
signatures are too inconsequential to alter the outcome of an election, and are
therefore permissible." 7 Such an approach toward small political movements
is consistent with the Commission's longstanding view that Article 3 does not
require a system of proportional representation; each party need not receive
seats in the legislature in proportion to its percentage of the popular vote."8
The Commission apparently does not consider the exclusion from the legisla-
ture of a party with a small but demonstrable following to be discriminatory.
Rather, such an exclusion is a legitimate exercise of discretion by a state.
b. Non-Discrimination
Article 3 of the Protocol does not contain an anti-discrimination provision,
but the Commission has adjudicated claims of electoral discrimination under
108 Id. at 24.
109 W. v. Belgium, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 110.
110 Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 179, 180 (Eur. Comm'n of H.R.).
Ill X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 2728166, 25 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
38, 40 (1967).
112 H. v. The Netherlands, App. No. 9914/82, 33 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 242, 245-46
(1983).
113 X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7730/76, 15 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 137 (1979); X.
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7566/76, 9 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 121 (1976).
114 X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 6850/74, 5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 90,
93 (1976).
115 Id. at 94.
116 M. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10316/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 129, 135
(1984).
117 See X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 94.
118 X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7140175, 7 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 95, 96-97 (1976).
The Court affirmed this view in Mathieu-Mohin v. Belgium, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23-24 (1985).
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Article 14, the general anti-discrimination clause of the European Conven-
tion." 9 As with Article 2 of the Political Covenant, 2 ' Article 14 of the Eu-
ropean Convention forbids discrimination on any ground, and the list of
prohibited distinctions is not limited by restrictive phraseology. The European
Court has confirmed the Commission's non-categorical approach to Article 3
by holding that Article 14 does not provide a remedy against all instances of
inequality.' Rather, the Court's test focuses on the reasons for differential
treatment. The test asks whether:
[Tlhe facts found disclose a differential treatment; ... the distinction does not have
a legitimate aim, i. e., it has no objective and reasonable justification having regard
to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration; and ... there is no
reasonable proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
realised.1
The test's initial criterion concerns not only facially discriminatory laws, but
those laws that affect similarly situated persons differently. The British Liberal
Party in a challenge to Great Britain's simple majority electoral system."
The Liberals claimed that the dominant parties' refusal to adopt a proportional
system constituted discrimination based on political opinion and party affilia-
tion. Liberal Party candidates received 13.8 percent of the popular vote in the
May 1979 general election, but received only 1.7 percent of the seats in the
House of Commons, thereby vastly diminishing the power the party would
possess under a proportional system. 24 The Commission agreed that the
system functioned to the Party's detriment, but found that the simple majority
electoral system passed other elements of the test. As a result, the Commission
found that differential electoral treatment was not per se discriminatory. 12
119 See Liberal Party v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8765/79, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
211 (1980) (reviewing claim that simple majority electoral system constitutes discrimination based on
political opinion and party affiliation); Lindsay v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8364/78, 15 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 247 (1979) (reviewing similar claim in regard to elections for European Parliament).
Article 14 provides: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."
European Convention, supra note 104, art. 14. The Court has held that Article 14 does not operate
independently of other Convention provisions. Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 94
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1985). Article 14 therefore does not itself act as a source of rights. However,
if a party alleges a violation of another article of the Convention, the Court or the Commission will conduct
an Article 14 inquiry even if the party ultimately fails to prove a violation of that other article. Id.
Conversely, once a tribunal finds a violation of another article, it will not consider claims under Article
14. Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1979).
120 See supra note 61 (quoting Article 2).
121 Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Belgium (Belgian
Linguistics Case), 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1968).
122 Geillustreerde Pers N.V. v. The Netherlands, App. No. 5178/71, 8 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 5, 14-15 (1976); see VAN DUn & vAN HOOF, supra note 93, at 542 (discussing test).
123 Liberal Pany v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8765/79, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 211,
221 (1980).
124 Id. at 213.
125 Id. at 221.
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The second criterion, whether an "objective and reasonable justification"
supports differential treatment, has been the crucial issue in most claims under
Article 14. Review of this standard requires the Court or Commission to strike
a "fair balance between the protection of the interests of the community and
respect for the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Convention" when
reviewing a state's justifications for differential treatment. " In Liberal Party
the Commission found no Article 14 violation, reasoning that "[t]he simple
majority system is one of the two basic electoral systems. It is or has been
used in ma[n]y democratic countries. It has always been accepted as allowing
for the 'free expression of the opinion of the people' even if it operates to the
detriment of small parties."127 The Commission went on to note that the
simple majority system is followed in states "which know of a fundamental
right to equality of voting [yet] still admit the simple majority system as
complying with this requirement."2' This decision suggests that the Commis-
sion will view distinctions which have long been part of Europe's common
political heritage as "objective and reasonable."" 2
The third criterion, proportionality, has received somewhat less attention
from the European Court and Commission, perhaps because the Court and
Commission can only determine whether a restriction is reasonably proportion-
al to its goal on a case-by-case basis. 3
3. The American Convention on Human Rights
Article 23 of the American Convention explicitly tracks Article 25 of the
Political Covenant, varying only in minor respects.' Yet despite textual
126 Belgian Linguistics Case, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44.
127 Liberal Pary, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 225.
128 Id.
129 In Lindsay v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8364/78, 15 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 247
(1979), the only other case decided under Article 14, the Commission rejected a challenge by members
of the British Ulster Dominion Party to the use of a proportional representation system in Northern Ireland
for elections to the European Parliament, on the grounds that the system's purpose of protecting minority
rights was objective and reasonable.
130 In Lindsay, for example, the Commission simply mentioned the requirement without analysis:
"it does not appear that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed
and the aim sought to be realised.' Id. at 252.
131 Article 23 provides:
1) Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities:
a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen represen-
tatives;
b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of
the voters; and
c) to have access, under general conditions of quality, to the public service of his
country.
2) The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preced-
ing paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil
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similarities, the unique problems in the region have sent the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights in its own interpretive directions. The Inter-
American Commission has not focused on elucidating particular treaty terms,
unlike both the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the European tribunals.
Its reports often concern states in which the ruling party has suspended repre-
sentative government entirely and is engaged in widespread violations of other
human rights.'32 Many of these reports involve actions which clearly violate
Article 23, such as fraud, intimidation, and misuse of government property
during election campaigns, whereas few of the reports contain a close textual
analysis of the American Convention. The Commission may face narrower
issues in the future now that, all OAS member states except Haiti are ruled by
elected governments.
The Commission's review of the 1990 elections in Mexico presents its most
significant decision on participatory rights, as it held that violations of these
rights in the Inter-American system are emphatically a matter of international
concern.13 The Commission rejected Mexico's arguments that because the
Convention's participatory rights provisions impinge upon state sovereignty,
they should be implemented gradually, and that only Mexican courts may
determine the validity of Mexican law or practices.
34
According to the Commission, the central issue under Article 23 is whether
an election is "authentic."' 35 The Commission has defined an "authentic"
election as one occurring in the context of "a legal and institutional structure
conducive to election results that reflect the will of the voters."'36 The Coin-
and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings.
American Convention, supra note 6, art. 23; cf. Political Covenant, supra note 6, art. 25. The following
states are parties to the American Convention as of 1991: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. The United States has neither
signed nor ratified the Convention. See Annual Report ofthe Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
1990-1991, OEA/ser.L.V/II.79, rev. 1, at 539, (1991).
132 See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, OEA/ser.LIVII.77, doc. 18, rev. 1, at
9-27 (1991) [hereinafter Haiti Report]; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama,
OEA/ser.L/VII.76, doe. 16, rev. 2, at 47-61 (1989) [hereinafter Panama Report]; Report on the Situation
of Human Rights in Haiti, OEAIser.LIV/II.74, doc. 9, rev. 1, at 53-105 (1988); Report on the Situation
ofHuman Rights in Paraguay, OEA/ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 19, rev. 1, at93-113 (1987) [hereinafterParaguay
Report]; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, OEA/ser.L/V/II.66, doe. 17, at 253-83 (1985)
[hereinafter Chile Report]; The Situation of Human Rights in Cuba: Seventh Report, OEA/ser.L/V/II.61,
doc. 29, rev. 1, at 25-37 (1983) [hereinafter Cuba Report]; Annual Report of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights 1979-1980, OEA/ser.LIV/II.50, doc. 13, rev. 1, at 120-24 (1980) [hereinafter 1979-
1980 Annual Report] (reviewing status of human rights in Uruguay).
133 Mexico Elections Decision, Cases 9768, 9780, 9828, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 97, 97, OEA/ser.
L/VI11.77, doe. 7, rev. 1 (1990).
134 Id. at 103-05.
135 The Commission has not explained its choice of the term "authentic," despite the fact that Article
23 of the American Convention and Article 25 of the Political Convention solely employ the term
.genuine."
136 Panama Report, supra note 132, at 47; see also Mexico Elections Decision, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
at 108 (*IThere must be some consistency between the will of the voters and the result of the election.
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mission has stated that excessive government intrusions into the political
process warp and delegitimize electoral outcomes, 3 ' and held that states
should strive to prevent "a disproportionate presence of the government" in
electoral activities.' 38 An authentic election, therefore, is one in which no
barriers, such as direct intimidation, fraud, and harassment, come between the
popular will and the election's results. 39 If necessary, an independent elec-
toral commission should verify voting rolls, tabulate ballots, and monitor cam-
paign conduct." ... .- -I .
The most important prerequisite to an authentic election is the absence of
coercion or intimidation of voters.' 4' An institutional structure immune from
manipulation by the incumbent government provides the best guarantee that
such coercion will not occur. 42 In the states investigated, electoral coercion
often occurs through restrictions on political parties, which range from bans
on all opposition groups or parties professing certain ideologies to restrictions
on specific party activities. 43 The Commission has concluded that one-party
states are inherently coercive, and by implication such states are incapable of
holding authentic elections.'" The Commission argues that pluralism pre-
vents individuals or groups from acquiring monopolies on political power.' 45
The absence of pluralism results in governments which are estranged from the
views of their citizens, and therefore do not embody an "authentic" popular
choice.'"
In the negative sense the characteristic implies an absence of coercion which distorts the will of the
citizens.*).
137 1979-1980 Annual Report, supra note 132, at 124; Chile Report, supra note 132, at 282; Panama
Report, supra note 132, at 115; Paraguay Report, supra note 132, at 113.
138 Mexico Elections Decision, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 112.
139 Panama Report, supra note 132, at 47 (suggesting that laws governing electoral campaigns also
should be shaped by popular input).
140 Panama Report, supra note 132, at 48-57.
141 Haiti Report, supra note 132, at 10; Mexico Elections Decision, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 108.
142 Cuba Report, supra note 132, at 36-7; Panama Report, supra note 132, at 47.
143 See Cuba Report, supra note 132, at 37 (noting that party restrictions impede "the existence of
healthy ideological and Party pluralism, which is one of the bases of a democratic system of government');
Panama Report, supra note 132, at 50; Paraguay Report, supra note 132, at 97.
144 See Cuba Report, supra note 132, at 35 ("IiThe intolerance of the groups in power toward any
form of political opposition represents the principal limitation on participation.').
145 INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TEN YEARS oF AcivFmEs 1971-1981, 334
(1982) [hereinafter INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS]; MexicoElectionsDecision, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. at 107.
146 Chile Report, supra note 132, at 282. Encroachments by military leaders also impugn the integrity
of representative institutions. In Uruguay, for example, a constitution drafted by a committee of the armed
forces permitted only a single presidential candidate who must receive military approval. The constitution
also vested all executive power in a council composed mainly of military officers, required military approval
for the national budget, and stacked the national Constitutional Tribunal with active military officers. 1979-
1980 Annual Report, supra note 132, at 122-24. The Commission reported after its 1980 investigation that
this constitutional scheme deprived Uruguayans of participatory rights, because the government they could
elect wielded little if any actual power. Id. at 123.
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4. Other International Instruments Guaranteeing Participatory Rights
a. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
Article 13 of the African Charter guarantees participatory rights, but
because the provision lacks enforceable standards its utility remains limited.
Article 13 provides that "[e]very citizen shall have the right to freely partici-
pate in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen
representatives, in accordance with the provisions of the law."147 The "freely
chosen" requirement implies the right to vote without coercion or intimidation.
However, unlike the Political Covenant or the European Convention, the
African Charter fails to stipulate that an electoral choice must reflect the free
expression of the electors' will or the opinion of the people. The absence of
such a provision suggests the African Charter permits one-party elections.1
48
Article 13 also lacks provisions on discrimination, universal suffrage, and a
secret ballot. Finally, the reservation that all rights need only be "in accor-
dance with the provisions of the law" suggests that Article 13 requires nothing
more of states than what is already required by their national constitutions. If
so, then Article 13 is almost entirely useless as an international standard of
conduct by which each state is to measure the legality of its actions.149
b. Council on Security and Co-operation in Europe Accords
The Council on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) recently
adopted three documents containing lengthy and highly detailed provisions on
participatory rights. The three documents are the culmination of a long negoti-
ating process which began with the 1975 CSCE Final Act (generally referred
to as the Helsinki Accords). 50 While CSCE states did not originally intend
147 AfricanCharter, supra note 6, art. 13. Lackof background materialsmakes investigation of rights
articulated in the African Charter difficult. Transcripts of a crucial drafting meeting have yet to be released
to the public, and the decisions of the African Commission on Human Rights are kept confidential to protect
the safety of the petitioners. See Daniel C. Turack, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights:
Some Preliminary Thoughts, 17 AKRON L. REV. 361, 377 (1984). The text of the Charter alone, however,
suggests that it provides guarantees substantially narrower in scope than those found in the American and
European Conventions or the Political Covenant.
148 The *freely chosen" clause does not necessarily contradict this interpretation, as one could argue
that because the Charter does not require the candidate pool or election results to mirror accurately the
opinions of the electorate, a government can limit the number of parties and candidates. The "freely chosen"
clause could require merely an absence of coercion in any election, including one involving pre-selected
parties or candidates.
149 The African Commission on Human Rights might defy this reading of Article 13 by referring
to Article 60 of the African Charter, which directs the Commission to "draw inspiration from international
law on human and peoples' rights" and in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and "other
instruments adopted by the United Nations.'
150 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act (Helsinki Accords), Aug. 1, 1975,
14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). See generally Buergenthal, supra note 92, at 217-20 (providing overview of
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for the Helsinki process to produce legally binding treaties,15 provisions in
subsequent agreements read as obligatory rather than merely hortatory stan-
dards.
For example, the Copenhagen Document, concluded on June 29, 1990,
begins with a number of broad statements affirming the importance of repre-
sentative government.152 It then sets out principles directing the structure of
all electoral systems. 153 The document also sets standards for the observation
of elections, a provision intended to "enhance the electoral process."" Fur-
ther, the Charter of Paris, signed on November 21, 1990 by the CSCE heads
of state, contains broad endorsements of participatory rights. 55 The Charter
also creates an institutional structure to oversee their implementation by
establishing an Office for Free Elections that is charged with the task of
implementing the provisions of the Copenhagen Document concerning partici-
patory rights. 5 ' Its duties include compilation of information on elections
in participating states, facilitation of election observation, and organization of
educational seminars on election procedures and democratic institutions."5
negotiating process).
151 See Alexander C. Kiss & Mary F. Dominick, The International Legal Significance of the Hunan
Rights Provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293 (1980) (describing history
of CSCE process).
152 See Copenhagen Document, supra note 92, pmbl., 29 I.L.M. at 1307 ("rThe signatories] welcome
the commitment expressed by all participating States to the ideals of democracy and political pluralism as
well as their common determination to build democratic societies based on free elections and the rule of
law.").
153 Id. 4 5.1-5.4, 29 1L.M. at 1308. Paragraph 7 elaborates these principles, and it is worth quoting
at length from the Document for its thorough exposition of participatory rights. Paragraph 7 requires
participating states to: "hold free elections at reasonable intervals" (1 7.1); "permit all seats in at least one
chamber of the national legislature to be freely contested in a popular vote" (1 7.2); "guarantee universal
and equal suffrage to adult citizens" (1 7.3); "ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent
free voting procedure, and ... are counted and reported honestly with the official results made public"
(1 7.4); "respect the ight of citizens to seek political or public office... without discrimination" (1 7.5);
"respect the right of individuals and groups to establish, in full freedom, their own political or other
political organizations and provide such political parties and organizations with the necessary legal
guarantees to enable them to compete with each other on a basis of equal treatment" (17.6); "ensure that
law and public policy work to permit political campaigning to be conducted in a fair and free atmosphere
in which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates from
freely presenting their views and qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning and discussing them
or from casting their vote free of fear of retribution" (1 7.7); "provide that no legal or administrative
obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political
groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process" (1 7.8); and "ensure that
candidates who obtain the necessary number of notes required by law are duly installed in office and are
permitted to remain in office until their term expires or is otherwise brought to an end in a manner that
is regulated by law in conformity with democratic parliamentary and constitutional procedures" (1 7.9),
29 I.L.M. at 1310.
154 Id. 8, 29 I.L.M. at 1310. This provision permits representatives of CSCE states and "any
appropriate private institutions and organizations" to observe national elections in participating states.
155 The Charter succinctly states that signatories "undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen
democracy as the only system of government of our nations." Charter of Paris, supra note 92, pmbl., 30
I.L.M. at 193.
156 Id. art.1, § 6, 30 I.L.M. at 195.
157 Id.
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The CSCE dramatically strengthened the normative force of its standards
in October 1991 through the Moscow Document.15 Drafted following the
attempted Soviet coup, the Moscow Document condemns "unreservedly forces
which seek to take power from a representative government of a participating
State against the will of the people as expressed in free and fair elections. ",159
In the event of a coup against an elected regime, the Document directs member
states not to recognize the usurping force."6 This commitment repudiates
the time-honored de facto control test, under which any government in control
of a nation is recognized by other states. In its place, the Moscow Document
substitutes a Wilsonian notion of democratic legitimacy."" The Document's
remarkable affirmation that human rights issues "do not belong exclusively to
the internal affairs of the State concerned" underscores the fact that the signato-
ries consider a regime's legitimacy a question of international concern, effec-
tively merging notions of internal and external legitimacy.162
5. Summary of Treaty-Based Norms
The preceding review of global and regional treaty systems reveals that a
free, fair and legally sufficient election consists of the following four elements
as a matter of treaty law: universal and equal suffrage; a secret ballot; elec-
tions at reasonable periodic intervals; and an absence of discrimination against
voters, candidates, or parties. Many inconsistencies remain, however, such
as the legitimacy of one-party elections or restrictions on coercion, intimida-
tion, or harassment of voters. The next Part below examines a substantial body
of state practice that contributes to the development of participatory norms-the
monitoring of national elections and plebiscites. Election monitoring reports
provide essential data for resolving interpretive ambiguities in treaty texts.
III. INTERNATIONAL ELECTION MONITORING:
THE ELABORATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS
The United Nations has monitored a variety of elections in the post-war
era, developing standards for "free and fair" elections that approximate quite
closely the participatory rights guaranteed by the Political Covenant and other
instruments. Interestingly, the United Nation's authority to do so was not based
158 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Document of the Moscow Meeting on the
Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect for Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the Rule of Law, and
Procedures for Fact-Finding, Oct. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1670 (1991) [hereinafter Moscow Document].
159 Id. 17.1. 30 I.L.M. at 1677.
160 Id. 17.2., 30 I.L.M. at 1677.
161 See supra notes 27-43 and accompanying text (discussing recognition standards).
162 Id. pmbl., 30 I.L.M. at 1672 (noting that respect for human rights "constitutes one of the
foundations of the international order").
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on the treaties previously discussed, but on the U.N.'s peacekeeping and
decolonization powers and on mission-specific resolutions reflecting the
invitations of the monitored states. This lack of an explicitly normative function
for election monitoring may be attributed, at least in part, because U.N.
election monitoring activities proceeded the development of the international
human rights treaties. The U.N. standards specifically address several ques-
tions left unresolved by ambiguous treaty language and are therefore useful
in interpreting the human rights treaties. 63 Cold War tensions, which relegat-
ed political rights to the bottom of the human rights agenda, were also a factor.
Yet the coincidence of purpose and principles between monitoring activities
and treaty norms suggests that future monitoring missions should be explicitly
based upon the treaties themselves, in order to better link treaty-based rights
with a viable enforcement mechanism.
A. Election Monitoring Prior to 1945
Regular national elections did not become common in Europe until the mid-
nineteenth century, and it so is not surprising that foreign observers monitored
few national elections before the First World War. While foreign observers
monitored several plebiscites on national self-determination during this peri-
od,' these early votes did not generate a consistent set of criteria by which
to judge elections.165
The plebiscites held after 1918, however, produced a more consistent set
of monitoring criteria. The Treaty of Versailles provided for referenda in ten
territories of mixed ethnic composition.' 66 The treaties did not establish spe-
163 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides: "A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
164 See LAWRENCE T. FARLEY, PLEBIscITES AND SOVEREIGNTY 4 (1986) (noting instances of pre-
World War I election monitoring). Several well-known plebiscites concerning the unification of the Italian
provinces were held from 1848 to 1870. Other plebiscites of a similar nature followed, each involving
questions of territorial affiliation: Moldavia and Wallachia (1857), the Ionian Islands (1863), St. Thomas
and St. John in the West Indies (1866), St. Bartholomew in the West Indies (1877), and Norway (1905).
See generally SARAH WAMBAUGH, A MONOGRAPH ON PLEBIscrrEs wrrH A COLLECTION OF DocuMENTs
58-169 (1920) (discussing early plebiscites). In addition, a limited number of property-owning citizens in
several territories under French control in the latter part of the 18th century were asked whether they
favored annexation by France or another political affiliation. The plebiscites were conducted in Avignon,
Savoy, Nice, the Belgian Communes, the Rhine Valley, Alsace, and the Republics of Mulhausen and
Geneva. Id. at 33-57. The Geneva vote, however, can hardly be called a plebiscite: a group of citizens
assembled in a meadow, surrounded by 1600 French soldiers, who voted to terminate the existence of their
republic. Id. at 57.
165 Early plebiscites generally were seen as territorial disputes between hegemonic powers, rather
than opportunities for people to determine their own political future. See FARLEY, supra note 164, at 5.
166 Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T. S. 189, 2 Bevans 43. Plebiscites were held
in Schleswig (1920), Allenstein and Marienwerder (1920), Klagenfort Basin (1920), Upper Silesia (1921),
Sopron (1921), and the Saar Territory (1935). The Allies planned but did not carry out plebiscites in
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cific election guidelines, requiring only that troops from the various interested
states be evacuated from the plebiscite zones and that the "freedom, fairness
and secrecy" of the ballot be ensured. 7 Instead, the Allied Plebiscite Com-
missions developed their own standards to implement the treaty requirements:
the first electoral criteria promulgated by a diverse international body. The
Commission's first task was to establish order. They did so by establishing
supervisory control over their zones and enforcing penalties for intimidation,
bribery, fraud, and other offenses connected with registration and voting.,6
They then granted the franchise to the inhabitants of a territory without regard
to sex, property ownership, or literacy.'69 Campaigning occurred by groups
on both sides of the -ballot question with only modest restrictions,7 0 and
voting occurred by secret ballot."' These minimal requirements represent
the standard for more comprehensive monitoring practices under the United
Nations system.
B. Monitoring Under the United Nations System
The recognition of a right to self-determination in the U.N. Charter" 2
and subsequent General Assembly resolutions' " vastly increased the scope
of multinational election monitoring. The new right required the development
of mechanisms to ascertain the preferences of peoples emerging from colonial-
ism. Rather than deferring to the decisions of established local leaders or
colonial powers, the United Nations sought to follow democratic standards in
the decolonization process. These missions constitute a substantial source of
Teschen, Spisz, and Orava. See generally 1 SARAH WAMEAUGH, PLEDISCriES SINCE THE WORLD WAR
46-411 (1933) (discussing plebiscites arising from Treaty of Versailles).
167 Treaty of Versailles, supra note 166, art. 88 (Annex art. 3), 225 Consol. T.S. at 239 (Upper
Silesia); see also id. art. 49 (Annex art. 34), 225 Consol. T.S. at 222 (Saar Basin); art. 97, 225 Consol.
T.S. at 242 (East Prussia); art. 109, 225 Consol. T.S. at 250-51 (Schleswig). The provisions concerning
Upper Silesia also granted the Allied Plebiscite Commission the power "to order the expulsion of any person
who may in any way have attempted to distort the result of the plebiscite by methods of corruption or
intimidation." Id. art. 88 (Annex art. 3), 225 Consol. T.S. at 239.
168 See 1 WAMBAUGH, supra note 166, at 442-54, 482; D.W. BOWEIT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES:
A LEGAL STuDY 8-11 (1964).
169 1 WAMBAUGH, supra note 166, at 474-77.
170 1 Id. at 468-69. The sole exception occurred in Sopron, where the Allied Plebiscite Commission
prohibited "propaganda" of any kind. 1 Id. at 468. This regulation was, however, widely ignored in
practice. 1 Id. at 285-86.
171 1 Id. at 481.
172 U.N. CHARm art. 1, 2 (declaring that United Nations to be dedicated to "develop[ing] friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples"); id. art. 55 (same).
173 See, e.g., Declaration on the Granting ofIndependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) (declaring
that all peoples "have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development").
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law, as they mark an area of consistent international consensus on participatory
rights.
1. The Decolonization Process
The drafters of the U.N. Charter had colonial territories foremost in mind
when proclaiming a right to self-determination.174 The Charter explicitly
requires member states to "develop self-government" in their "non-self-govern-
ing territories" and to "take due account of the political aspirations of the
peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free
political institutions."175 The General Assembly in 1953 adopted a resolution
that outlined criteria for the determination of "self-government"176 and that
proposed a number of alternatives to colonial status, to be decided by the
democratic choice of a territory's population."TI In 1960 the General Assem-
bly further clarified the meaning of "non-self-governing" by reaffirming the
popular sovereignty requirements of the 1953 resolution: 78 self-government
by integration with an independent state, for example, should be accomplished
"through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based
on universal adult suffrage. "179 These principles guided the organization of
plebiscites in a number of non-self-governing territories,180 and in all but one
174 See Humphry, supra note 14, at 195-96.
175 U.N. CaARTER art. 73(b).
176 Factors Which Should Be Taken Into Account in Deciding Whether a Territory Is or Is Not a
Territory Whose People Have Not Yet Attained a Full Measure of Self-Government, G.A. Res. 742 (VIII),
U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex, at 22-23, U.N. Doc. A/263 (1953).
177 See id. pt. 1(B)(1) (stating that full independence requires "[c]omplete freedom of the people of
the Territory to choose the form of government which they desire'). The resolution also declares that states
wishing to establish "other separate systems of self-government" ascertain the opinion of the population
through "informed and democratic processes,' Id. pt. 2(A)(1), whereas a territory forming an association
with another state must make constitutional provision for "[ulniversal and equal suffrage, and free periodic
elections, characterized by an absence of undue influence over and coercion of the voter or of the
imposition of disabilities on particular political parties." Id. pt. 3(C)(1). The resolution explains "an absence
of undue influence and coercion" by listing such factors as the existence of more than one political party
in the territory, a secret ballot, the absence of marital law, and freedom to criticize the incumbent
government. Id.
178 See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A14684 (1960).
179 Id. Annex Principle IX(b); see also id. Annex Principle VII(a) (stating that self-government
through association with another state "should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples
of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes').
180 See, e.g., UNITED NATIoNs, GENERALASSEMBLY, SPECLALCOMMITEEON THE SrrUATIONWrTH
REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO
COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSION TO OBSERVE
THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN THE TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS, U.N. Do. A/AC. 109/664 (1981); UNITED
NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SPECIAL COMMrrrEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND
PEOPLES, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION TO OBSERVE THE ELECTIONS IN THE NEW HEBRIDES,
U.N. Doe. A/34/852 Annex (1980) [hereinafter New Hebrides Report]; Report of the Representative of
the Secretary-General in West Irian, Submitted UnderArticle XXI, Paragraph I, of the Agreement Between
the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian),
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case (West Irian) the plebiscite commissioner reported to the Secretary-General
that the vote was conducted freely and fairly
181
The General Assembly explicitly outlined monitoring standards in authoriz-
ing several of the missions. For example, the General Assembly sought to
"ensure full respect for democratic freedoms... [and] universal adult suf-
frage" for the plebiscite in Equatorial Guinea.' The General Assembly
likewise urged Britain to abolish a regime based upon emergency powers and
declare an amnesty for all imprisoned and exiled political workers in Rwanda-
Urundi, in order that the population of the territory could "resume normal,
democratic political activity before the elections."" It also recommended
voting by universal adult suffrage in French Togoland and Western Samoa.'"
U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Annex II, Agenda Item 98, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/7723 Annex I (1969) [hereinafter
West Irian Report]; Report of the United Nations Representativefor the Supervision of the Elections in the
Cook Islands, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Items 23 & 24, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/5962 (1965)
[hereinafter Cook Islands Report].
181 See, e.g., Cook Islands Report, supra note 180, at 149, 151 ('I was satisfied that the people were
able to exercise their rights, while the Observers and I were in the Territory, prior to and during polling
in complete freedom .... Mhe counting of the votes was correct and the reporting of the results was
accurate.').
The U.N. Trusteeship Council also institutionalized the principle of self-determination. The Council
is charged with the administration of the colonies of defeated World War II powers, and the territories
formerly under League of Nations mandate. U.N. CHARTER art. 77, 1. In order to further the trust
territories' "progressive development towards self-government or independence" in accordance with "the
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned," U.N. CHARTER art. 76, the Council has dispatched
missions to observe eight plebiscites or elections. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to
Observe the Plebiscite in Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, U.N. TCOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No.
2, at 1, U.N. Doc. T/1885 (1986); Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite
in the Federated States ofMicronesia, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, U.N. TCOR, 51st Sess., Supp.
No. 2, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. T/1860 (1984); Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the
Plebiscite in the Northern Mariana Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, U.N. TCOR, 43d Sess.,
Supp. No. 2, at 2-4, U.N. Doc. T/1771 (1976); Question of the Future of Ruanda-Urwidi: Report of the
United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Annex 2, Agenda Item 49, at
1, U.N. Doc. A/4994 (1961) [hereinafterRuanda-Urundi Report]; Report of the United Nations Plebiscite
Commissionerfor Western Samoa, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 48, at 48, U.N. Doc.
T/1564 (1961) [hereinafter Western Samoa Report]; Report of the United Nations Plebiscite for the
Cameroons Under United Kingdom Administration, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 41,
at 1, U.N. Doc. A/4314 (1959); Report of the United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the
Elections in Togoland Under French Administration,, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Annex 1, Addendum to
Agenda Item 40, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/3957 (1958); The Future of Togoland Under BritishAdministration:
Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, U.N. TCOR, 18th Sess., 733d mtg. at 279, U.N.
Doc. T/1258 (1956) [hereinafter British Togoland Report].
182 Question of Equatorial Guinea, G.A. Res. 2355, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, 1641st
plen. mtg. at 54, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
183 Question of Rwanda-Urundi, G.A. Res. 1579, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 34.
U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
184 See The Future of Togoland under French Administration, G.A. Res. 1182, U.N. GAOR, 12th
Sess., Supp. No. 18, 724th plen. mtg at 27, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957). This question also arose in Western
Samoa, where the Trusteeship Council and Samoan leaders disagreed on whether the franchise should be
restricted to heads of families in deference to Samoan tradition. The Council argued that Samoa should
follow 'the normal practice of secret ballot for legislative elections," Western Samoa Report, supra note
181, at 5, and the General Assembly eventually resolved that the elections should be conducted by universal
adult suffrage. See Question of the Future of Western Samoa, G.A. Res. 1569 U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, 724th plen. mtg. at 34, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
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Of particular interest is the plebiscite in West Irian, in which the General
Assembly approved an "act of self-determination to be carried out in accor-
dance with international practice," thereby explicitly acknowledging the
existence of an accepted international body of participatory standards." 5
There is little uniformity in the observers' reports on participatory rights,
though party pluralism formed a recurrent concern. Some reports merely
describe the extent of the franchise, limitations on public debate, fairness in
vote tabulation, and other such issues without critical comment."' However,
monitoring standards have evolved over the decades, as evidenced by the
differences between the West Irian and the Namibian missions.
a. West Irian
West Irian, also known as West New Guinea, was a former Dutch colony
claimed by Indonesia since its independence in 1949. i87 Indonesia agreed
with the Netherlands in 1962 to allow an "act of free choice," in which the
people of West Irian would decide whether to remain part of Indonesia.'
The arrangements for the "act" were to be made "with the assistance and
participation" of a U.N. representative as well as local representative councils.
Further, the agreement called for universal suffrage. The entire act was to be
"carried out in accordance with international practice"'8 9 and the United
Nations and Indonesia were to "guarantee fully the rights, including the rights
of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly, of the inhabitants of
the area. "190
The General Assembly approved the agreement soon after it was
signed,' 9 ' but the Secretary-General did not appoint a representative to ob-
serve the act until 1969. The representative soon found himself in ongoing
185 This language (with emphasis added) comes from a 1962 agreement between the Netherlands and
Indonesia, creating a role for U.N. election monitors. Agreement Concerning West New Guinea (West
Irian), Aug. 15, 1962, Indon-Neth., art 18, 437 U.N.T.S. 273, 282 [hereinafter West Irian Agreement].
The General Assembly accepted this role shortly thereafter. G.A. Res. 1752, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess.,
Supp. No. 17, at 70, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). See infra notes 187-201 and accompanying text.
186 See, e.g., Cook Islands Report, supra note 180, at24 (noting that five political parties contested
election); Report of the United Nations Special Mission to Observe the Act of Self-Determination in Niue,
U.N. Doc. A/9623/rev. 1, at26 (1974) [hereinafter Niue Report] (noting wide public discussion of issues
prior to referendum). In Equatorial Guinea, for exampl , the mission head merely noted the importance
of "all political groups and candidates being able to enjoy freedom of assembly, being able to conduct their
political campaigns, being able freely to express their views on all issues related to the elections, having
equal access to the media of communication and having equal opportunity to present lists of candidates.'
United Nations Missionfor the Supervision of the Referendum and the Elections in Equatorial Guinea, U.N.
Doc. A/72001Add.4, Annex V-VI, at 46 (1968) [hereinafter Equatorial Guinea Report].
187 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, NATION AGAINsT NATION 76-82 (1985).
188 West Irian Agreement, supra note 185, at 5.
189 Id. art. XVIII.
190 Id. art. XXII.
191 G.A. Res. 1752 (XVII), supra note 185.
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conflict with the Indonesian authorities. The government wanted to consult only
elected representatives, not the population at large. 92 The representative
initially suggested a traditional plebiscite, arguing that there was "no other
method for this delicate political exercise than the democratic, orthodox and
universally accepted method of 'one man, one vote."''  However, he con-
ceded that "the geographical and human realities in the territory required the
application of a realistic criterion" and proposed that consultation occur in the
countryside if a direct vote were held in urban areas.194 The government
rejected this proposal, and announced that it would consult eight "consultative
assemblies" of 1025 persons.1 95 Other disputes followed.196
The consultations took place in June 1969. Each of the eight assemblies
voted unanimously, without the benefit of a secret ballot and in the presence
of Indonesian government officials, to retain ties with Indonesia. 197 The
representative's report concluded that "an act of free choice has taken place
in West Irian in accordance with Indonesian practice." 19 In the subsequent
General Assembly debate, Ghana proposed allowing West Irian another
opportunity to carry out the terms of the 1962 agreement, but the proposal was
soundly defeated,' and the General Assembly accepted the representative's
report.20'
b. Namibia
The Namibian mission in 1989 demonstrates the evolution of U.N. monitor-
ing standards since the shameful West Irian mission.2"' In Namibia the Unit-
ed Nations made certain that clear standards for electoral participation were
192 West Mrian Report, supra note 180, at 76-78.
193 Id. 82.
194 Id.
195 Id. 11 83-85.
196 For example, the representative attempted to ensure that all adults would be permitted to run as
candidates for the representative assemblies. The government responded that only "legally existing" groups
would be represented in the assemblies, and stated that bodies not favoring ties with Indonesia did not
"legally' exist. Id. 1 126.
197 Id. 11 185-247.
198 Id. 1253. Recall that the agreement specified a consultation in accord with international practice.
See supra text accompanying note 185.
199 Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning
West New Guinea (West Irian): Report of the Secretary-General Regarding the Act of Self-Determination
in WestIrian (Concluded), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., 1813th plen. mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1813 (1969)
(proposal); id. at 16-17 (vote).
200 Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning
West New Guinea (West Irian), G.A. Res. 2504, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, 1813th plen.
mtg. at 3, U.N. Doe. A/7630 (1969).
201 Professor Franck recounts that '[e]ven members of the Indonesian government were reported to
have admitted, privately, that this consultation was a meaningless formality." FRANcK, supra note 187,
at 81. United Nations observers subsequently never were so sanguine about the suppression of opposition
parties, the lack of free campaigning, and the denial of a secret ballot.
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articulated throughout the planning process. Perhaps more importantly, the
observers consistently refused to permit the South African administering
authorities to deviate from the standards in practice.' °a
The United Nations began to lay the groundwork for democratic self-rule
in Namibia in the mid-1970s. In 1976 the Security Council adopted Resolution
385, calling for "free elections in Namibia under supervision and control of
the United Nations."2'0 The Security Council developed a comprehensive
settlement plan for the territory in 1978, which created a transitional working
group to facilitate "the early independence of Namibia through free elec-
tion[s]."204 In 1982 the five-member Western Contact Group,2 °' which had
mediated disputes among the various parties, negotiated a set of electoral
guidelines with South Africa to implement the 1978 plan. These guidelines
stipulated specific voting rights to be guaranteed to all adult Namibians.1
202 The territory of present-day Namibia became a German protectorate beginning in the nineteenth
century, and came under South African control through military conquest in 1915. This arrangement was
confirmed in 1920 by the League of Nations, and continued under the aegis of the United Nations following
World War II. In 1948 South Africa granted whites in the territory direct representation in its parliament
and threatened to annex the territory as a fifth province. See generally NATION BUILDING, supra note 15,
at 10-11. The International Court of Justice ruled in 1950 that South Africa had no right to alter the
mandate unilaterally. International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (July 11). The General
Assembly formally revoked the mandate in 1966 and placed the territory under direct U.N. supervision.
See G.A. Res. 2145, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The I.C.J.
upheld these actions in 1971. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 6
(Jan. 26). That same year the Southwest Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) began an armed rebellion
against South African occupation, which lasted until the declaration of a cease-fire in July 1988. SeePrinciples for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa, Approved by the South African Govemment
on July 18, 1988, reprinted in NATION BU.DING, supra note 15, app. X at 117 (reprinting agreement
between Republic of Angola, Republic of Cuba and Republic of South Africa). SWAPO agreed to this
settlement in August 1988. See UNITED NATIONS, SECURiTY COUNCIL, LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. S/20129 (1988).
203 S.C. Res. 385, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1885th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. SINF/32 (1976).
204 S.C. Res. 435, U.N. SCOR, 33d Sees., 2087th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. SINF/34 (1978).
205 The Group consisted of the western members of the Security Council in 1976: Canada, France,
West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See NATION BUILDING, supra note 15, at 17-
18.
206 The guidelines stated:
Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation, from
any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly.
Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write.
The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the electoral
system, the preparation of voter rolls and the respects of electoral procedures will be promptly
decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their
political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process.
Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed.
The electoral system will seek to ensure fair representation in the Constituent [sic] Assembly
to different political parties which gain substantial support in the election.
UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, LETTER DATED JULY 12, 1982 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF
CANADA, FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF [GERMANYI(sic), THE KiNGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
Annex at 1, U.N. Doc. S/15287 (1982).
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United Nations representatives and South African administrators began to
negotiate a legal framework for elections based on these guidelines in 1989.
The concessions obtained by the United Nations were remarkable. South Africa
eventually agreed to grant a general amnesty for all Namibian political prison-
ers and to repeal all "discriminatory or restrictive laws" and regulations which
might inhibit a free and fair vote.2 7 South Africa also agreed to a party
registration system that permitted any political organization to field candidates
if it could obtain two thousand signatures and pay a modest deposit. 2°8 As
the election approached, U.N. observers helped repatriate exiled Namibians,
obtain the release of political prisoners, and register voters and parties. °9
The November 1989 election was a resounding success for the United
Nations, and particularly for the standards of electoral fairness it had devised.
Ten different parties or coalitions of parties appeared on the ballot.210 Ninety-
seven percent of eligible voters cast ballots, and seven parties obtained seats
in the seventy-two-member Constituent Assembly.21' The Secretary-General's
Special Representative certified that the electoral process had "at every stage,
been free and fair."212 In February 1990 the Namibian Constituent Assembly
unanimously adopted a new constitution which incorporated the electoral
principles approved by the Security Council in 1989.213
207 Both steps were taken in June 1989. See NATIoN BUILDING, supra note 15, at27-28. The repealed
laws restricted "communist" political dissent, banned or limited activities by certain political organizations,
suspended various rights under a state of emergency decree, authorized detention without trial, and imposed
a curfew through much of the territory. Id. at 28.
208 Id. at 31.
209 See id. at 37-42. The most contentious discussions concerned a new electoral law proposed by
South Africa, which compromised ballot secrecy by labelling ballots with voters' identification numbers,
rejected local (and allegedly faster) tabulation of ballots, and denied observation posts at polling places to
political parties. Id. at 32. The Security Council responded to this law by asked the Secretary-General to
ensure that all electoral legislation conform to the principles enunciated by the Western Contact Group and
to "internationallyaccepted norms for free and fair elections."S.C. Res. 640, U.N. Doc. SIRES5640 (1989)
(available on microfiche). In October 1989, the South African Administrator General and the Secretary-
General's Special Representative agreed on a law which responded to virtually all criticisms. The only
disputed provision not wholly altered by this second proposal concerned centralized tabulation and
verification of ballots, as it limited centralized tabulation to cases in which a voter's identification was in
question. See NATION BUILDING, supra note 15, at 34.
210 UNnIED NATIONS, SECRErARY-GENERAL, FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 (1978) CONCERNING THE
QUESTION OF NAMmA at 2, U.N. Doc. S/20967 (1989).
211 NATION BUILDING, supra note 15, at 57, 64. The South West Africa People's Organization
received the most votes, obtaining 41 seats; second was the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance with 21. A
number of small parties shared the remaining seats. Id. at 64.
212 Id. at 110.
213 Article 17 of the Namibian Constitution provides:
(1) All citizens shall have the right to participate in peaceful political activity intended to
influence the composition and policies of the Government. All citizens shall have the right
to form and join political parties and, subject to such qualifications prescribed by law as
are necessary in a democratic society, to participate in the conduct of public affairs, whether
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Every citizen who has reached the age of eighteen (18) years old shall have the right to vote
and who has reached the age of twenty-one (21) years to be elected to public office, unless
The Right to Political Participation
The Namibian mission capped the United Nations' electoral practices in
the decolonization era, reflecting standards consistently promulgated by
election monitors since the British Togoland mission in 1956.2"4 The most
important of these was the prohibition on any substantive restrictions on party
activity." 5 In insisting on party pluralism the United Nations made clear that
the ambiguities of the Political Covenant on this crucial issue would not carry
forward into the new era of participatory rights. The election's success served
to validate these monitoring standards; in fact, the Namibian mission was so
successful that when the United Nations began monitoring elections in indepen-
dent states, the question of standards was hardly debated, as subsequent
missions applied virtually the same criteria.
2. Monitoring in the Post-Colonial Era
United Nations monitoring in colonial territories composed the first phase
of multilateral election observation. The second phase began in July 1989 when
the Secretary-General agreed to oversee elections in Nicaragua, committing
the United Nations to observe elections in an independent state for the first
time. While decolonization was no longer the rationale for the monitoring
process, the missions applied and developed the same set of standards. The
missions to Nicaragua and Haiti illustrate the direction of this second phase.
a. The Nicaragua Mission
The Nicaragua mission originated in the Esquipulas II Agreement, an
August 1987 pact among the presidents of five Central American coun-
tries.2" 6 The Agreement, which outlined a broad framework for peace in the
region, called on the five states to hold "free, pluralistic and fair elections"
by June 1988 and invited the United Nations, the OAS, and other states to send
otherwise provided herein.
(3) The rights guaranteed by Sub-Article (2) hereof may only be abrogated, suspended or be
impinged upon by Parliament in respect of specified categories of persons on such grounds
of infirmity or on such grounds of basic public interest or morality as are necessary in a
democratic society.
NAmmi. CONST. art. 17. The influence of the Political Covenant on Article 17 is evident in the last phrases
of subsection (1), which quote from Article 25(a) of the Political Covenant almost verbatim. Cf supra note
6 (quoting Article 25 of Political Covenant). The Namibian Constitution goes farther, however, by making
participatory rights non-derogable. NAMIB. CONST. art. 24(3).
214 See NATION BUILDING, supra note 15, at 6 ("The success of UN-supervised elections in Namibia
also signifies the growing importance of an internationally recognized legal framework for free and fair
elections.").
215 See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text (discussing failure of Political Covenant to clearly
require party pluralism).
216 SeeLetterDated27August 1987froim the Permanen Representatives of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala and Nicaragua to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 42d
Sess., Agenda Item 34, U.N. Doc. A/42/521 (1987) [hereinafter Esquipulas llAgreement].
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observers.217 The United Nations agreed to assume a role in November
1988.2 1 In February 1989, President Daniel Ortega announced elections in
Nicaragua and invited Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cueller to send a
monitoring team." 9 The Secretary-General accepted the invitation in July
and announced the formation of the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify
the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN). °
The Secretary-General was initially circumspect in describing ONUVEN's
tasks, declaring that the mission should not "be construed as any kind of value
judgement as to the laws in force in Nicaragua governing the electoral pro-
cess. " 1 However, the comprehensive "terms of reference" that served as
the mission's mandate required ONUVEN to verify that the election was
"equitable," "free," "without hindrance or intimidation," and "proper:"'n
determinations that clearly called for U.N. observers to make value judgments
on the fairness of Nicaragua's electoral laws. A review of the U.N. terms of
reference and of ONUVEN's five reports reveals that the United Nations
217 Id.
218 The General Assembly directed the Secretary-General "to afford the fullest possible support to
the Central American Governments in their efforts to achieve peace, especially by taking the measures
necessary for the development and effective functioning of the essential verification machinery." UNrrED
NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE SrruATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA: THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECUrTY AND PEACE INIIATVES, para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/24 (1989) [hereinafter Tim
SrrUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA].
219 LetterDated 24 February 1989from the Representatives of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 34, Joint Declarations of the Central American Presidents, at 2, U.N. Dec.
A/44/140 (1989).
220 SeeLetterDatedSJuly 1989from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the Permanent Representa-
tive of Nicaragua to the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doec. A/441375 (1989). The
mission eventually issued five detailed reports: Evolution of the Electoral Process in Nicaragua: FirstReport
of the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua to the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 34, U.N. Doec. A/441642 (1989) [hereinafter First
Nicaragua Report]; Second Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Observer Mission to
Verify the ElectoralProcess in Nicaragua, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 34, U.N. Doec. A/441834
(1989) [hereinafter Second Nicaragua Report]; ThirdReport to the Secretary-General by the UnitedNations
Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item
34, U.N. Doec. A/441917 (1990) [hereinafter Third Nicaragua Report]; Fourth Report to the Secretary-
General by the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 34, U.N. Doec. A/441921 (1990) [hereinafter Fourth Nicaragua Report];
Fifth Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral
Process in Nicaragua, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 34, U.N. Doec. A1441927 (1990) [hereinafter
Fifth Nicaragua Report]. The mission at its height deployed 237 U.N. personnel in the field. Fifth
Nicaragua Report, supra, at 17.
221 LetterDated 5 July 1989from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the Permanent Representative
of Nicaragua to the United Nations, The Situation in Central America, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex
I, Agenda Item 34, Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives, at 2, U.N. Dec.
A144/375 (1989).
222 Establishment and Terms of Reference of the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the
Electoral Process in Nicaragua, The Situation in Central America, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex 1,
Agenda Item 34, Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives, app. at 3, U.N. Dec.
A/441375 (1989) [hereinafter Terms of Reference]. The terms of reference were derived from three
agreements among the Central American presidents, including the Esquipulas II Agreement. Id.
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indeed took specific positions on three important issues: party pluralism, the
conduct of the Supreme Electoral Council, and the compilation of voting
lists. 2 3
Party pluralism was a central focus of the Esquipulas II Agreement, which
required its signatories to ensure "equal access for all political parties to the
communication media and .. . ample opportunities for organizing public
demonstrations and any other type of political propaganda." 24 Accordingly,
the U.N. terms of reference required ONUVEN to "verify that political parties
enjoy complete freedom of organization and mobilization, without hindrance
or intimidation by anyone [and to] verify that all political parties have equitable
access to State television and radio in terms of both the timing and the length
of broadcasts."I Further, the government agreed to repeal certain statutes
(concerning, for example, conscription, public safety, and certain police duties)
and to promulgate a new electoral law. 6 ONUVEN concluded that the
resulting guidelines were "sufficiently open to ensure that the elections [would]
take place in an atmosphere of free competition."'2 In particular, it approved
of the procedures for the formation of political parties and their acquisition of
legal status. 28
223 ONUVEN itself later described the purpose of its reports as seeking "to pinpoint critical-and
criticizable-aspects of the process and of the positions of the contestants." Third Nicaragua Report, supra
note 220, at 24. Furthermore, the Secretary-General's representative stated in transmitting his final report
that verifying the election "demanded more than merely recording the process, more than monitoring, and
could not stop short of actively seeking to get corrected whatever substantial defects had been discovered."
Fifth Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 3. The representative dismissed a "purely passive" role for
ONUVEN as "morally unacceptable." Id.
224 Esquipulas llAgreement, supra note 216, at 6. The Agreement further stated:
Complete pluralism of political parties must be established. Political groupings shall, in this
connection, have broad access to the communication media and full enjoyment of the rights of
association and the power to hold public demonstrations in unrestricted exercise of the right to
publicize their ideas orally, in writing and on television, and members of political parties shall
enjoy freedom of movement in campaigning for political support.
Id. at5.
225 Terms of Reference, supra note 222, at 3. These standards conflicted directly with an article of
the Nicaraguan constitution which exempted "those ideologies advocating a return to the past or seeking
to establish a political system similar to that of the past" from a guarantee of party pluralism. First
Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 11 (quoting Article V of Nicaraguan Constitution). This constitutional
provision is a clear reference to the deposed Somoza regime. ONLJVEN never suggested that it would alter
its mandate in order to accommodate this article, thus further eroding the Secretary-General's claim that
the mission would not criticize existing Nicaraguan law.
226 First Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 6.
227 Fourth Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 7 (citation omitted).
228 See First Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 17. ONUVEN monitored all aspects of party
activity throughout the electoral process. This included assessment of the submission and authorization of
candidate lists, of party financing, and of violence directed towards party activists, particularly towards
those in the opposition. See Fourth Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 7-11. The mission also investigat-
ed the use of state property by FSLN candidates, see Third Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 17, the
frequency and openness of mass meetings, see id. at 11-13; Second Nicaragua Report, supra note 220,
at 16-17, and the degree of access to polling places and ballot tabulation centers, see Fifth Nicaragua
Report, supra note 220, at 6, 8.
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Second, the U.N. observers reviewed the conduct of the Supreme Electoral
Council (CSE), which directed all aspects of the electoral process.2 The
U.N. terms of reference required ONUVEN to verify that "political parties
are equitably represented in the [CSE] and its subsidiary bodies." ' The
National Assembly elected the five members of the Council in June 1989: two
from the Sandinista party, two from opposition parties, and one "eminent
person."" 1 The National Assembly also elected members of various opposi-
tion parties to regional electoral councils, with all but one election by unani-
mous vote." ONUVEN reviewed over one hundred resolutions promulgated
by the CSE on such issues as electoral ethics, donations from abroad, register-
ing absentee voters and a timetable for the elections. It reported that an
"[a]nalysis of these resolutions does not reveal bias towards the governing
party. ""3 ONUVEN continued to monitor the Council throughout the campaign
and on the eve of the elections concluded that "[t]here has been evidence of
broad-mindedness, flexibility and a determination to ensure-as far as possi-
ble-the greatest possible participation of political groups in the electoral
process. "24
Third, ONUVEN reviewed the compilation of voting lists." The new
electoral act provided that local boards were to revise fifteen-year-old rolls,
each in a specified geographic area. 6 ONUVEN trained and mobilized some
55,000 registration workers, monitored as many registration sites as possible,
and reviewed written complaints. The mission ultimately concluded that the
process was a logistical success and was free of any attempts to obstruct
registration. 7
The U.N. terms of reference also required the mission to monitor the equality of access to the mass
media, an issue closely related to the broader question of equal campaigning opportunities. The Nicaraguan
government adopted a new Mass Media Act in 1989 that eliminated prior censorship for print media and
imposed only minimal restrictions on radio broadcasts. ONUVEN found the law "an improvement over
the earlier legislation" under which censorship had been widespread. Second Nicaragua Report, supra note
220, at 21. ONUVEN criticized the government-operated television station, however, as wholly biased
in favor of the ruling party:
[The station] overlooks the usual criteria for determining what coverage should be given to a
news item, taking into account neither the political importance of the event, the number of people
present nor its duration.... Not only is there less coverage of the opposition, but events are
usually deliberately distorted to present opponents in the worst possible light.... Television
is offering a narrow and dangerously Manichean view of national and international politics.
Id. at 24.
229 First Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 6. The Nicaraguan Constitution established the CsE
as a fourth branch of government, independent of the executive, legislature, and judiciary.
230 Terms of Reference, supra note 222, at 3.
231 First Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 7.
232 Id. at 8.
233 Id. at 9.
234 Fourth Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 8.
235 ONUVEN was required to ensure that electoral rolls were "properly drawn up." Terms of
Reference, supra note 222, at 3.
236 Id.
237 l. at 7-11.
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Finally, while the U.N. terms of reference did not explicitly direct
ONUVEN to monitor polling places and the tabulation of ballots, ONUVEN
assumed these to be among its most important tasks." ONUVEN prepared
a comprehensive questionnaire for its poll watchers, designed to record any
irregularities in the voting procedures set forth in the Electoral Act. 9 The
problems generally were minor (e.g., a shortage of paper ballots and the
absence of a closed-off area in some polling places) and, in ONUVEN's
opinion, did not cast doubt on the fairness of the elections.' ° As a further
safeguard against fraud, ONUVEN devised a formula to project the outcome
based on approximately seventeen percent of precinct returns. This so-called
"quick count" of the elections, held on February 25, 1990, deviated by less
than one percent from the official results, according to which UNO won fifty-
five percent and the Sandinistas forty percent of the vote in the presidential
election.241 In its final report ONUVEN concluded that "the elections were
conducted in a highly commendable manner, and no problems have been
detected which might cast doubts on their fairness. "242
b. The Haiti Mission
The second request for monitoring in an independent state came from Haiti.
The Haitian government attempted to hold elections in 1987, but outbreaks of
violence and voter intimidation lead to their cancellation even before the polls
were to have closed.243 The next three years saw a succession of military-
backed governments take power, followed by a provisional civilian govern-
ment.2' In June 1990 Ertha Pascal Trouillot, President of the provisional
regime, asked the Secretary-General to send a U.N. team to monitor elections
scheduled for December 16 of that year. 45 President Trouillot requested that
the mission undertake several specific duties:
238 Nicaragua had requested electoral observers to verify the process "at every stage and in all
electoral districts." Terms of Reference, supra note 222, at 3.
239 Fifth Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 7.
240 Id. at 9.
241 Id. at 10, 21. UNO's presidential and vice-presidential candidates received at total of 777,552
votes compared to 579,886 for the FSLN candidates. The next most popular slate received 11,136 votes.
Fifth Nicaragua Report, supra note 220, at 20.
242 Id. at 12.
243 CouNcL OF FREELY-ELECTED HEADS OF GOV'T & NATIONAL DEMocRATIc INST. FOR INT'L
AFFAmS, THE 1990 GENERAL ELECTioNS iN HAIi 32-33 (1991).
244 UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASsEMBLY, FIRST REPORT OF THE UN1TED NATIONS OBSERVER
GROUP FOR THE VERIFCATION OF THE ELECTIONS IN HAt, Annex, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/45/870, (1990)
[hereinafter First Haiti Report].
245 Letter Dated 17 July 1990from the Permanent Representatives of the Bahamas, Colombia and
Haiti to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Agenda Item, Draft Resolution on Assistance to Haiti, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/44I9651Add.1 (1990).
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[O]bservation and verification of the elections, covering the entire electoral process,
particularly registration of voters on the electoral rolls, registration of candidatures,
freedom of expression and freedom of political parties to mobilize, respect for the
equality of candidates in the electoral campaign, and independent verification of the
outcome of the vote .. .46
The General Assembly adopted an authorizing resolution on October 12,
1990,247 despite some states expressing concerns over the lack of a clear
mandate248 and interference in Haiti's internal affairs.249 While the mission
(named the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elec-
tions in Haiti (ONUVE-)) never received a formal mandate akin to the
Nicaraguan "terms of reference," President Truillot's request effectively served
that purpose.' ° In substance, the mission scrutinized virtually the same core
of participatory rights at issue in Nicaragua and Namibia.
The mission faced a formidable task. As ONUVEH noted in its first report,
"there is no democratic tradition in Haitian politics ... [and] violence has
always been the means of settling conflicts and choosing leaders. "25 The
violence surrounding the 1987 elections had, in ONUVEH's view, "created
a feeling of insecurity . . . all the more acute because those responsible have
not been sought out or arrested. "I The elections also faced logistical barri-
ers. There was no permanent register of voters, forcing the government to
246 Id. President Truillot also sought "advisors with experience in security matters" to assist the
Haitian armed forces in maintaining order. Id. at 3.
247 UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ELECTORAL AssIsTANcE To HAITI, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/2 (1990) [hereinafter ELECrORAL AssisTANcE TO HAmi].
248 UNITEDNATIONS, GENERALASsEMiLY, PROVISIONALVERBATIMREPORTOFTHE TWENTY-NINTH
MEEniNGat61, U.N. Doc. A/45/PV.29 (1990) [hereinafterTwENTY-NINTHMEETINo] (statementofCuban
delegate).
249 Cuba, which supported the resolution, spoke against "any attempt to ise this United Nations
resolution or activity as a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of Haiti, a fraternal country." Id.
at 62. National elections, Cuba stated, "can never be regarded as affecting international peace and security"
and so cannot involve a breach of the Charter leading to collective action. Id. at 58-60. The Mexican
delegate likewise argued that "sending this mission will not set a precedent in respect of the domestic
jurisdiction of States .... [E]lectoral processes lie within the domain in which domestic legislation in each
State is sovereign." Id at 64-65. Even the Haitian delegate rose to make "it clear that our actions in no
way impinge upon or alter the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the country." Id. at 71.
250 The authorizing resolution refers to President Trouillot's letter as the basis for the mission's work.
Id. operative para. 1 (requesting Secretary-General to grant "the technical and administrative assistance
to the electoral process that has been requested in the letter from the President of the Interim Government
of the Republic of Haiti to the Secretary-General"). ONUVEH itself repeated the substance of the
President's request in its first report:
The task of the electoral observers is to observe the different electoral operations and to assess,
in particular, whether the political parties have been free to organize and allowed to mobilize
the voters, whether the candidates have had equal access to the media, whether voters have been
able to register and cast their ballots freely and whether the votes have been counted honestly.
First Haiti Report, supra note 244, at 6.
251 FirstHaiti Report, supra note 244, at 9. While Haiti passed a new election law three months prior
to the establishment of the mission, there was considerable controversy over provisions requiring all
candidates to pay a deposit prohibiting persons who were associated with the Duvalier government or who
previously committed human rights abuses from running for office. Id. at 7-8, 18.
252 Id. at 12.
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draw up new voter rolls for each election. 3 Further, candidate registration
procedures proved too complex, causing many potential candidates to be
disqualified for filing incorrect or incomplete documentation. 4
ONUVEH monitored compliance with the rights listed in President Trouil-
lot's request. It reported that individuals representing "all shades of opinion"
entered the elections, despite the cumbersome and confusing candidate registra-
tion procedures,' 5 and noted that the government permitted journalists to
engage "in the most violent diatribes" without interference." While instanc-
es of double registration partially marred the voter registration process, in
ONUVEH's view precautions taken against double voting vitiated the prob-
lem. 7 ONUVEH also questioned whether ballot secrecy was preserved at
all polling places, but concluded that any breaches were due to inadequate
facilities and voters requesting assistance rather than organized attempts at
fraud 8 ONUVEH concluded that apart from an attack on an opposition
rally late in the campaign (for which no particular group was ever found
responsible) the process operated smoothly and the electoral authorities func-
tioned in an impartial manner5 9
Yet ONUVEH's success was short-lived. Supporters of former President
Duvalier attempted a coup against President-elect Aristide on January 6, 1991.
The army quickly defeated this uprising but officers staged a second and
successful coup on September 29, forcing President Aristide to flee the coun-
try. The international community reacted with unprecedented swiftness, with
the recent democratic elections providing the appropriate argument with which
to condemn the takeover. OAS foreign ministers, hastily convened in Washing-
ton on October 13, 1991, declared that the coup "represent[ed] disregard for
the legitimate Government of Haiti, which was constituted by the will of its
people freely expressed in a free and democratic electoral process under
253 Id. at 14.
254 For example, fifty-eight percent of those seeking to register as presidential candidates were
rejected for failing to meet the filing requirements. Id. at 17. Twenty-six people originally registered as
candidates for the presidency. Id.
255 Id. at 19.
256 Id. at 11.
257 Id. at 14-16; see also Special Economic and Disaster Relief Assistance: Electoral Assistance to
Haiti, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Annex, Agenda Items 86 & 154, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/45/870/Add.1 (1991)
[hereinafter Second Haiti Report].
258 Second Haiti Report, supra note 257, at 8, 22 (noting that observers "did not detect any sign of
fraudulent intent or any trace or suggestion of planned action" in the voting itself).
259 Id. at 19, 23. ONUVEH, together with an OAS observer team, used the same "quick count" of
election results that it employed successfully in Nicaragua. ONUVEH released its projections to the Haitian
electoral council and the major candidates in order to dissuade any fraud in the tabulation process. Id. at
13. It projected (with a six-point margin of error) that Jean-Bertrand Aristide would win the presidency
with 66.4 percent of the vote. According to the official returns, Aristide received 67.5 percent. IM. at 12,
14.
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international observation. "I The Ministers recommended that all OAS mem-
ber states sanction the military government by suspending their economic and
commercial ties to Haiti." One week later the U.N. General Assembly
passed a resolution urging U.N. member states to join the OAS embargo.262
The resolution referred to the Aristide regime as "legitimate" and the coup as
"illegal," thus reinforcing the OAS position that the disregard of democratic
procedures in Haiti constituted an international wrong.263
C. Future United Nations Monitoring Missions
Two other monitoring projects, now in their early stages, provide further
evidence of an emerging body of electoral norms sanctioned by the United
Nations.2' The first project is an extraordinary mission to Cambodia in
which the United Nations will not only structure and oversee elections, but will
also function as the country's de facto government during a year-long transition
period." All major parties to the conflict agreed to a comprehensive set of
electoral guidelines in October 1991.6 The second project concerns a refer-
endum in Western Sahara, approved by the Security Council, to determine
whether the inhabitants desire independence or Moroccan rule.267 The refer-
endum, which the Security Council characterized as an act of decolonization,
is to be organized and monitored jointly by the United Nations and the Organi-
zation of African Unity."6 The interested parties and the Secretary-General
260 Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, MRE/RES.1191, corr. 1, at 2, OEAIser.FIV.I
(Oct. 3, 1991). The resolution resurrected the legitimacy theory of recognition by declaring that the OAS
would recognize representatives of the Aristide government 'as the only legitimate representatives ofHaiti."
Id.
261 I.
262 The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, G.A. Res. 4617, at 3 (1991) (available
on microfiche) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 46/7].
263 The General Assembly did not refer to human rights treaties, suggesting that its condemnation
rested on principles of customary law. The Haitian junta, perhaps deterred by the forcefulness of this
condemnation, has yet to send its own delegation to the General Assembly. As of this writing delegates
appointed by President Aristide continue to represent Haiti in all U.N. bodies.
264 A cease-fire in Angola also calls for U.N. monitoring of the next round of elections. Alan Riding,
Angola Accord May Help Heal Old Wounds, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at A9. The Secretary-General
had sent only an advance team by February 1992, and seeks formal Security Council authorization for the
project. Perez de Cuellar to Askfor Observer Mission forAngolan Elections, Agence France-Presse, Dec.
21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Crnt File.
265 Letter Dated 30 October 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex II, Agenda Item
24, Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, at 8-9, U.N. Doc.
A/46/608 (1991).
266 Id. at 13-14. These include: 1) a system of proportional representation; 2) universal adult suffrage;
3) freedom to form political parties; 4) voting by secret ballot; 5) complete freedom of speech, assembly
and movement; and 6) fair access to the media for all registered parties. Id. at 25-27, 40-41.
267 S.C. Res. 690, U.N. Doc. S/RES/690 (1991) (available on microfiche).
268 UNIrED NATIONS, SECURIrY CoUNcIL, FouRTH COMMITEE, QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA,
U.N. Doc. A/43/797 (1988) ("the question of Western Sahara is a question of decolonization which remains
to be completed on the basis of the exercise by the people of Western Sahara of their inalienable right to
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will draft a code of conduct designed to "ensure... [a] responsibility placed
on all concerned to accept others' freedom to campaign."269
Future missions are likely to continue refining the United Nation's emerg-
ing body of electoral standards. In November 1991 the Secretary-General
announced the appointment of a permanent coordinator of electoral matters
within the Secretariat. He also proposed a set of criteria to evaluate monitoring
requests by member states,27 which require that: 1) the election have a clear
international dimension; 2) the monitoring cover the entire electoral process;
3) there be broad public support in the state for the presence of U.N. monitors;
4) the concerned government seek the U.N. action; and 5) the competent U.N.
organ approve the mission.27 The General Assembly approved these recom-
mendations in December 1991.2'
D. Election Monitoring and Treaty Norms: The Legal Effect of the New Regime
The development of election monitoring standards raises three issues
concerning participatory rights: the relationship of the monitoring standards
to the substantive treaties establishing the rights themselves; the degree to
which boundaries of national sovereignty concerns limit the enforcement of
participatory rights; and the relationship between participatory rights and other
human rights.
self-determination and independence").
269 UNITEDNATIONS, SECURITY CouNcIL, THESITUATION CONcERNING WEsTERNSAARA: REPORT
BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. S/22464, at 8 (1991) [hereinafter Western Sahara Report]. The
Security Council accepted the report's proposals in its authorizing resolution. See S.C. Res. 690, supra
note 267, operative para. 3. The project also created a special Referendum Committee to advise the U.N.
team "on measures necessary to ensure that the referendum is free and fair, without military or administra-
tive constraints, and that there is no intimidation or interference in the referendum process." Western Sahara
Report, supra, at 7-8.
270 Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 98(b), at 25-26, U.N. Doec. A/46/609 (1991).
271 Id. at 25. The second and third criteria are straightforward: The United Nations cannot be in a
position to certify the fairness of an electoral process unless it actively monitors the election from the
beginning and receives full cooperation from the government. The first criterion, however, is ambiguous:
*hen does an election have a "clear international dimension?" Certainly such a dimension existed in
Nicaragua, where elections were the result of a regional peace process, and in Namibia, which was the
subject of U.N. regulation since the General Assembly established the United Nations Council for South
West Africa in 1967. See Question of South West Africa, G.A. Res. 2248 (S-V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Special
Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 1, U.N. Doec. A16657 (1967).
The crisis in Haiti, however, seemed to be purely domestic in character. The United States suggested
in debate a possible "international dimension," noting that political instability in Haiti had "swamped
neighboring countries with Haitian refugees." TWENTY-NniTH MEMET G, supra note 248, at 67 (statement
of Mr. Watson, U.S. delegate). If this factor provided a "clear international dimension" to Haiti's elections,
an international element could be found in virtually any national election. The next two U.N. monitoring
missions (to Angola and Cambodia) are not likely to clarify this criterion, as each developed out of
multinational peace processes.
272 Enhancing the Effectivenessofthe Principle ofPeriodic and Genuine Elections, G.A. Res. 46/137,
supra note 10, at 366-67.
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1. Using Mission Standards to Interpret Treaties
The preceding sections suggest that two distinct but parallel systems of
participatory fights now operate in the international community. The first
consists of global and regional human rights treaties, including the decisions
and reports of specialized tribunals. The second consists of a body of standards
developed by international observer missions. These two systems affect the
same state actors, address the same issues and, in many cases, protect the same
substantive rights. Both thus represent the international community's views of
a "free and fair" election.
No formal linkage exists between these two sources of law. Treaty-based
participatory rights have not explicitly formed the basis of any observer
mission, and the mission reports do not refer to any human rights instrument.
Neither do regional or global treaty systems provide for election monitoring
to enforce their norms.2' But our analysis need not end here. According to
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, evidence of the "ordinary
meaning" of treaty terms may be derived from sources not formally linked to
a treaty.274 The ordinary meaning of a term is presumably one which does
not vary with the context of its use but which rather has acquired a universal
understanding. The terminology of participatory rights has now achieved such
a context. While in the cold-war era terms such as "genuine" elections gave
rise to unresolvable ideological debates, that divisiveness is now fading. As
more states sign instruments protecting participatory rights and turn to elected
governments at home, and as the United Nations and other organizations
continue to monitor elections in sovereign nations, the language of electoral
fairness has become both more universal and more uniform. States holding
multiparty elections at home will be likely to call for the same standards of
fairness in the international setting. If such cross-pollination of standards
occurs, tribunals interpreting treaty terms may find little disagreement among
state litigants on their plain meaning.
Treaty and election-monitoring norms are the best evidence of this emerg-
ing consensus on goals and terminology. All signatories of the major human
rights conventions also have voted to establish the U.N. monitoring mis-
sions275 and to approve reports detailing participatory rights scrutinized by
273 The Copenhagen Document permits outside observers to monitor elections in member states of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), but does not link observation to the
substantive standards of fairness contained elsewhere in the document. See Copenhagen Document, supra
note 92.
274 Vienna Convention, supra note 163, art. 31(1). Note that the right to participation can also be
viewed as a "General Principle" of law. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to 'General
Principles ofInternational Law", 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 768 (1990).
275 See, e.g., Second Haiti Report, supra note 257 (Haiti); Terms of Reference, supra note 222
(Nicaragua); Question of the Turks and Caicos Islands, G.A. Res. 35/25, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp.
No. 48, at 218, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980); Question of the NewHebrides, G.A. Res. 34/10, U.N. GAOR,
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the observers. 6 Moreover, the rights protected by the treaty and election-
monitoring systems are strikingly similar. From the League-supervised plebi-
scites of the 1920s to the plans for U.N. administration of Cambodia, interna-
tional observers have made essentially the same demands of elections they
monitor: party activity must not be limited or disrupted, ballot secrecy must
be maintained, suffrage must be universal for adult residents, access to the
media must not be restricted, and fraud in voting and ballot tabulation must
34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 199, U.N. Doc. A/34146 (1979); Question ofNue, G.A. Res. 3155, U.N.
GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 105, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); Question ofAmerican Samoa Gilbert
and Ellice Islands, Guam, New Hebrides, Pitcairn, St. Helena, Seychelles and Solomon Islands, G.A. Res.
3156, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 105, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); Question of Equatorial
Guinea, G.A. Res. 2355, supra note 182, at 54; Supervision of the Elections to be Held in the Cook
Islands, G.A. Res. 2005 (XIX), U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/5815 (1966);
G.A. Res. 1752, supra, note 185 (West Irian); G.A. Res. 1579, supra note 183 (Rwanda-Urundi); G.A.
Res. 1569, supra note 184 (Western Samoa); The Future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons Under
United Kingdom Administration, G.A. Res. 1350, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 18A, at 1-2, U.N.
Doc. A/4090/Add.1 (1959); G.A. Res. 1182, supra, note 184 (French Togoland); The Togoland Unification
Problem and the Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland Under British Administration, G.A. Res. 944,
U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 24-25, U.N. Doc. A/3116 (1955) (British Togoland).
Several of the votes on U.N. monitoring missions occurred in the Trusteeship Council. See, e.g.,
Arrangements for the Dispatch of a Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau; Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands, T.C. Res. 2180, U.N. TCOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 5, U.N. Doc. T/1901
(1986) (Palau); Arrangements for the Dispatch of a Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscites in Palau,
the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, T.C.
Res. 2174, U.N. TCOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 5, U.N. Doc. T/1859 (1982) (Micronesia); Arrange-
ments for the Dispatch of a Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Mariana Islands District of
the Trust Territory ofthe PacificIslands, T.C. Res. 2160, U.N. TCOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 1, U.N.
Doc. T/1770 (1975) (Mariana Islands). The Namibian mission was authorized by the Security Council.
See S.C. Res. 385, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1885th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. SIINF/32 (1976).
276 See, e.g., The Situation in CentralAmerica: Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace
Initiatives, G.A. Res. 45/15, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 43d plen. mtg. at4, U.N. Doc. AIRES/45I15 (1991)
(Nicaragua); Question of Niue, G.A. Res. 3285, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, 2318th plen.
mtg. at 98, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (Niue); Question ofthe Gilbert and Ellice Islands, G.A. Res. 3288,
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, 2318th plen. mtg. at 99, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (Gilbert and
Ellice Islands); Report of the Fourth Committee, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., 1692d plen. mtg. at 22, U.N.
Doc. A/PV.1692 (1968) (Equatorial Guinea); Question ofthe CookIslands, G.A. Res. 2064, U.N. GAOR,
20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, 1398th plen. mtg. at 57, U.N. Doc. AI6014 (1965) (Cook Islands); The Future
of Western Samoa, G.A. Res. 1626, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 34, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961) (Western Samoa); The Future of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons Under United Kingdom
Administration: Organization of a Further Plebiscite in the Northern Part of the Territory, G.A. Res. 1473,
U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959) (Northern Cameroons); The
Future of Togoland under French Administration, G.A. Res. 1253, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No.
18, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958) (French Togoland).
In several cases the Trusteeship Council accepted the report of a visiting mission instead of the General
Assembly. See, e.g., Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau, Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, February 1986, T.C. Res 2182 (LIII), U.N. TCOR, 53d Sess., Supp.
No. 3, at 13, U.N. Doc. T/1901 (1986) (Palau); Report ofthe United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe
the Plebiscite in the Federated States of Micronesia, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, T.C. Res. 2177,
U.N. TCOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 1, U.N. Doc. T/1869 (1984) (Micronesia); Report of the United
Nations Visiting Mission to observe the plebiscite in the Marshall Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, September1983, T.C. Res. 2178, U.N. TCOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 1, U.N. Doc. T/1869
(1984) (Marshall Islands); Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to observe the plebiscite in the
Mariana Islands District, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, June 1975, T.C. Res. 2163, U.N. TCOR,
43d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. T/1779 (1976) (Mariana Islands). In almost every case these
resolutions were passed by unanimous votes or by consensus.
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be prevented.2' These requirements all consistently match the texts of the
major human rights treaties, and many echo holdings of the U.N. Human
Rights Committee, the European Court and Commission of Human Rights, and
the Inter-American Commission.278 While it is true that only the state which
requests monitoring is the object of electoral standards in any given case, all
member states have at some point participated in the formulation of such
standards. This fact undercuts the argument that U.N. election monitoring
standards should not be used to interpret treaties because the United Nations
monitors elections only at the invitation of member states.279 The political
organs of the United Nations which formulate these standards permit access
to all states, and their decisions represent the opinion of international communi-
ty as a whole. The fact that missions have been by invitation only does not
alter the nature of this decision-making process.
The standards derived from U.N. election monitoring permit the addition
of the following elements of a legally sufficient election to those derived solely
from the human rights treaties:280 1) citizens must have the opportunity to
organize and join political parties, and such parties must be given equal access
to the ballot; 2) to the extent the government controls the media, all parties
must have the opportunity to present their views through the media; and 3) the
election must be overseen by an independent council or commission not tied
to any party, faction, or individual, but whose impartiality is ensured both in
law and practice.
2. Sovereignty and the Right to Political Participation
Part II observed that while questions of political participation were subject
to states' exclusive domestic competence before the First World War, subse-
quent treaties developed internationally-cognizable participatory rights.28" ' Yet
absolutist notions of state sovereignty retain adherents. These states essentially
deny the enforceability of treaty-based participatory rights, and argue that any
distinction between elected and non-elected regimes compromises the principle
277 The West Irian mission remains the sole exception. However, the West Irian mission can be
distinguished because it originated in a bilateral treaty rather than an independent decision by an internation-
al organization to monitor the election.
278 Even where mission standards find no explicit support in treaty texts orjudicial interpretation-for
example, on the questions of party pluralism under the Political Convention and equal access to media under
the three major human rights treaties-no evidence exists to indicate that those standards contradict the
treaties.
279 Each member state may voice its opinion in the General Assembly and put objections on record.
Even in the Security Council, which approved the Cambodia and Namibia missions, any state may
participate in debates on election monitoring if it demonstrates an interest in the matter. See U.N. CHARTER,
art. 31.
280 See supra part II.B.5.
281 See supra notes 17-49 and accompanying text.
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of state equality.282 This view labels criticism of national governments as an
intervention into domestic affairs and contends that international law is de-
signed to preserve the diversity of national systems."
States making such claims are in a distinct minority."' But, more impor-
tantly, the notion of sovereignty invoked by the opponents of the international
enforcement of participatory rights is deeply flawed on at least three levels.
First, opponents of participatory rights depend upon an overbroad concep-
tion of sovereignty."s In their most extreme moments the opponents seem
to suggest that political rights are inherently beyond the competence of interna-
282 See Respectfor the Principles of National Sovereignty and Non-Interference in the InternalAffairs
of States in Their Electoral Processes, G.A. Res. 451151, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 69th plen. mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/151 (1990). This resolution invokes Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, appeals to
states to stop financing political parties or candidates in other states, and declares that "there is no single
political system or single model for electoral processes equally suited to all nations and their peoples.' Most
importantly, it asserts that any "extraneous" attempt to "interfere in the free development of national
electoral processes, in particular in the developing countries ... violates the spirit and letter of the
principles established in the Charter" and the Declaration on Friendly Relations. The vote on this resolution
evidenced a North-South split; the United States, other industrialized nations, and five Eastern European
nations voted against the resolution, while virtually all other U.N. member states voted for it. The Soviet
Union abstained. Id.
283 See e.g., Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art. 8, 70 U.N.T.S. 237, 254 ("Every
member State of the League shall respect the form of government obtaining in the other States of the
League, and shall recognize the form of government obtaining as one of the rights of those States, and shall
pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form."); CHARTER OF THE ORGAN.aATION OF
AMERICAN STATES, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 13, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 56
(*[e]ach State has the right to develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally").
Other norms arguably support this view: the lack of any general rules defining which governments
should or should not be recognized, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 203(1) ("[a] state is not required
to accord formal recognition to the government of another state"); the fact that membership in the United
Nations is not limited to states with representative governments, see U.N. CHARTER art. 4, 1; and the
absence of a right to intervene by force to preserve democratic government, see IAN BRowNuE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 338-42 (1963) (expressing skepticism as to legality of
any form of humanitarian intervention); Ved Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama
Under International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 500 (1990) ("the justification of invasion for the sake
of the institution of democracy has simply never been accepted'); see also see Lori F. Damrosch, Politics
Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 1
(1989) (discussing propriety of nonforcible intervention).
These arguments have arisen before in many contexts. For example, when the dispute between the
United States and Nicaragua reached the International Court of Justice, the United States argued that
Nicaragua's breach of a promise to hold free elections justified U.S. aid to the anti-government contras.
Military and ParamilitaryActivities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 130-33 (June 27). The Court responded
that in the absence of specific treaty commitments, it would not normally address the composition of a
state's government, since a "State's domestic policy falls within its exclusive jurisdiction." 1d. at 131. The
Court then stated that "[o]f its nature, a commitment to establish democratic government... is one of
a category which, if violated, cannot justify the use of force against a sovereign state." Id. at 133.
284 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 10, at 365 (affirming importance of free and fair elections
by vote of 135-3-13). However, participatory rights remain a relatively new concern for the United Nations,
unaided by the General Assembly's willingness to pass inconsistent resolutions on the subject in consecutive
sessions. See G.A. Res. 45/151, supra note 282 (declaring sanctity of domestic jurisdiction).
285 The most common claim of sovereign infringement is based on Article 2, paragraph 7 of the U.N.
Charter, which provides that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." This provision
limits the United Nation's jurisdictional competence; the mandatory language indicates that a state cannot
waive the requirement by consent.
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tional law. But this proposition is demonstrably false. How else are we to
explain that every major human rights treaty includes an article on political
participation? The United Nations, the Organization of American States, and
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe are spending increas-
ing amounts of time and resources on monitoring elections in independent
states. Indeed, in an era in which national environments and economic policies
have become the subject of prescriptive international norms it is difficult to
imagine an area inherently beyond the competence of international law. The
notion that states have exclusive sovereignty over all activities within national
borders is clearly outmoded. While the sheer weight of the doctrine's history
may still lend it rhetorical force, sovereignty so conceived simply does not
describe the contemporary world.
Second, the treaties themselves create binding law.286 Where an interna-
tional agreement is binding, the norm pacta sunt servanda obliges parties to
adhere to each of its provisions in good faith.287 States that have ratified the
Political Covenant or a regional equivalent therefore cannot claim that the
failure to hold "genuine" elections remains a matter of exclusive domestic
jurisdiction.28 Adherence may require the adoption of "such legislative or
other measures as may be necessary" to give effect to the prescribed
rights, 289 and breach entitles other parties to remedies specifically provided
for by the instrument as well as remedies generally provided under internation-
286 The General Assembly initially considered a non-binding declaration that would have left the
protection of human rights primarily to individual states. See Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 33-34.
The General Assembly eventually decided to adopt both a declaration (the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights) and a binding covenant (the Political Covenant), the latter leaving "no doubt about the legal nature
of the provisions it contains." Id. at 34.
Delegates to the Political Covenant's first drafting session in 1953 repeatedly expressed this view.
The Soviet delegate stated that including a right to political participation in the Covenant would ensure that
signatories' governments would be obliged to grant the right to all individuals in their states. See Commis-
sion on Human Rights, 363d Meeting, supra note 62, at 4; id. at 7 (statement of Yugoslavian delegate);
Commission on Human Rights, 364th Meeting, supra note 62, at 8 (statement of French delegate);
Commission on Human Rights, 367th Meeting, supra note 62, at 14 (statement of Australian delegate).
287 Vienna Convention, supra note 163, art. 26 ("[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith").
288 A number ofarticles in the Political Covenant, for example, contain mandatory language, requiring
specific, affirmative actions by state parties. For example, Article 2(2) requires states to adopt domestic
legislation to implement Political Covenant provisions, Article 2(3)(a) requires "effective" remedies in
domestic law for violation of the Political Covenant, Article 4(2) prohibits derogation from certain funda-
mental rights, and Article 41 requires state parties to submit periodic reports "on the measures they have
adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein." Political Covenant, supra note 6. See also
BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 572 ("The Covenants ... have legal force as treaties for the parties to them
... ."); Louis HENKiN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 990 (2d ed. 1987)
('[p]rotection of civil and political rights is a binding obligation from the time a state becomes a party to
that covenant').
289 Political Covenant, supra note 6, art. 2(2).
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al law for violation of treaty obligations.' The texts and the travaux of the
Political Covenant and the regional human rights treaties do not suggest that
participatory rights constitute exceptions to these requirements.291
The fact that participatory rights were once a purely domestic concern does
not affect the international enforcement of a treaty. Domestic jurisdiction is
fluid, definable only by reference to international law, including treaty
law.9 2 Thus, elections are not an immutable mainstay of the domestic
sphere, but may (and have) become the subject of binding international obliga-
tions through treaties 93 The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) has held
that a treaty commitment creates international law between the parties, and
states cannot appeal to the previously domestic nature of their obligations to
avoid sanctions for breach of a treaty." 4 A clear affirmation of the obligatory
290 RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 701 cmt. c; Louis Henkin, Human Rights and "Domestic
Jurisdiction," in HuMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI AccoRD 21, 25 (Thomas
Buergenthal ed. 1977). A treaty party's right to terminate the treaty or suspend its operation upon a material
breach by another party is not available in the case of human rights treaties. See Vienna Convention, supra
note 163, art. 60(5).
291 According to one commentator,
[n]othing in Article 25 or in other text of the Covenant justifies a distinction between the clarity
or immediacy of a state's duties under that article and, say, its duty to refrain from torture.
Citizens of a party to the Covenant would have a valid claim under international law if their
government had seized power and abolished elections.
Steiner, supra note 14, at 131. Nevertheless, Steiner suggests that Article 25 be implemented slowly over
time so that disparities between economic and social systems may be taken into account. Id. at 129-34.
The Spanish delegate noted In the final debate over the Political Covenant that "some people considered
that the principle of universal and equal suffrage should be introduced gradually because of the low
educational level in some countries," but argued that gradual enforcement was "unacceptable and should
not be included in a legal instrument such as the draft Covenant." Third Committee, 1096th Meeting, supra
note 62, at 180. No provision on gradual implementation was included. The Inter-American Commission
has also rejected a request to interpret Article 25 to permit gradual implementation of participatory rights,
and concluded that such a position "would condition the existence of human rights on 'the circumstances
and situation of each country' leaving the whole legal system in a precarious state." Mexico Elections
Decision, Cases 9768, 9780, 9828, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 97, 108, OEA/ser. LIV/11.77, doc. 7, rev. 1, at
118 (1990).
292 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion No. 4, Tunis & Morocco Nationality Decrees, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 4, at24 (Feb. 7) ("The question of whether a certainmatter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction
of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends on the development of international relations.');
see also C.G. Fenwick, The Scope of Domestic Questions in International Law, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 143,
144 (1925); Lawrence Preuss, Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations and Matters
of Domestic Jurisdiction, 74 HAGUtE RECuBIL DES Couns 553, 567 (1949); C.H.M. Waldock, The Plea
of Domestic Jurisdiction Before International Legal Tribunals, 31 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 96, 110 (1954).
293 As previously noted, the United States argued in the Nicaragua case that Nicaragua had breached
a commitment to the OAS to hold free elections. See supra note 283. The Court held that no binding
commitment existed, but noted in dicta:
The Court cannot discover, within the range of subjects open to international agreement, any
obstacle or provision to hinder a State from making a commitment of this kind. A State, which
is free to decide upon the principle and methods of popular consultation within its domestic order,
is sovereign for the purpose of accepting a limitation of its sovereignty in this field.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 131 (June 27).
294 See The S.S. Wimbledon (Gr. Brit., Fr., Italy, Japan, & Pol. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 1, at 25 (Aug. 17) (enforcing provision of Versailles Treaty over German claim of pre-existing
sovereign rights); Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 65,
70-71 (Mar. 30) (holding that interpretation of treaty is by its nature question of international law); see
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nature of treaty-based participatory rights was made by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights in an opinion involving elections in Mexi-
co.29 Mexico argued that American Convention on Human Rights "does not
limit the sovereign powers of the States to elect their political bodies. "I The
Commission disagreed, concluding that the Convention empowered it to
determine the compliance of states parties with the political rights outlined in
the Convention.9 7
also Tunis & Morocco Nationality Decrees, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 ("[I]n a matter which, like
that of nationality, is not in principle, regulated by international law, the right of a State to use its discretion
is nevertheless restrictedby obligations which itmay haveundertaken towards other States."). States cannot,
for example, invoke anti-democratic provisions of their own constitutions as a basis for dishonoring treaty
obligations to hold elections. See Vienna Convention, supra note 163, art. 27 ("[a] party may not invoke
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty"); Advisory Opinion No.
44, Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, at 24 (Feb. 4) (*a State
cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent
upon it under international law or treaties in force").
The parties to the Political Covenant voluntarily relinquished exclusive domestic control over political
participation by agreeing to hold genuine, periodic elections in which suffrage is equal, universal, and
conducted by secret ballot, and which guarantee the free expression of the will of the electors. Political
Covenant, supra note 6, art. 25. If states do not meet these minimum requirements by, for example, failing
to hold elections or by holding sham elections, the international community is entitled to impose sanctions.
The Covenant does not prohibit explicitly states from recognizing governments that obtain power in
violation of citizens' participatory rights. Instead, non-recognition forms a different kind of remedy from
others generally available for breach of treaty obligations. Those remedies are wholly permissive as parties
are not required to seek punishment for every violation of a right. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, §
902 ("[a] state may bring a claim against another state for violation of an international obligation owed to
the claimant state or to states generally") (emphasis added). Thus, since non-recognition is'simply another
such remedy, states remain free to extend or to deny recognition to illegitimate governments. For a
discussion of recognition by the U.N. in the form of accrediting delegates, see infra part V.
It is also important to emphasize that the provisions of human rights conventions provide minimum
criteria. The Political Covenant, for example, does not regulate all or even most aspects of the electoral
process. State parties retain domestic control over a range of issues that the Covenant does not address,
including whether an election is conducted by proportional representation or some other system, whether
candidates in a list system are chosen by the party or the voters, public financing of candidates; the length
of the campaign, contribution or spending limits imposed on candidates or parties, and the drawing of
electoral districts.
295 Mexico Elections Decision, Cases 9768, 9780, 9828, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 97, 108, OEA/ser.
L/V/11.77, doe. 7, rev. 1, at 98 (1990). The case involved a complaint by three Mexican citizens, who
alleged procedural improprieties in local Mexican elections and that electoral authorities failed to adjudicate
their claims of fraud. Mexico replied that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the claims, since the
structuring of elections was a matter reserved to its domestic jurisdiction. Id. at 103-05.
296 Id. at 104.
297 The Commission stated:
[iThe Mexican State, by virtue of having signed and ratified the Convention, has consented to
allow certain aspects of its internal jurisdiction to be the subject of judgments on the part of the
organs instituted to protect the rights and guarantees recognized by the Convention.... [ihe
Commission ... is empowered to examine and evaluate the degree to which the internal
legislation of the State party guarantees or protects the rights stipulated in the Convention and
their adequate exercise and, obviously among these, political rights. The IACHR is also empow-
ered to verify, with respect to these rights, if the holding of periodic, authentic elections, with
universal, equal, and secret suffrage takes place, within the framework of the necessary guaran-
tees so that the results represent the popular will, including the possibility that the voters could,
if necessary, effectively appeal against an electoral process that they consider fraudulent,
defective, and irregular or that ignores the 'right to access, under general conditions of equality,
to the public functions of their country.'
The Right to Political Participation
Third, a shift in the locus of sovereignty undermines the arguments against
participatory rights. For a non-democratic regime to claim that participatory
rights violate its national sovereignty begs the question of whether that regime
has legitimate authority to make such a statement. When the will of the people
is the basis of the authority of government, regimes that thwart the will of the
people will lack legitimacy. The participatory rights provisions of the human
rights conventions have succeeded in extending this notion of legitimacy from
the domestic to the international sphere. It is still an open question as to how
far this principle should be extended. But if political participation is to have
any meaning as an internationally enforceable right, the community of states
must be empowered to prescribe standards detailing how participation is to
occur and to insist that parties to the major treaties adopt these standards as
law. A regime that bases its legitimacy on nothing more than the fact that it
holds power exercises no "sovereign" authority to object to such prescriptions.
3. The Relationship Between Participatory Rights and Other Human Rights
Treaty-based participatory rights potentially conflict with other international
human rights. It has been argued that the potential for a "tyranny of the majori-
ty" in a democracy requires that other, counter-majoritarian rights be given
preference by the international community. Others argue that a minimum level
of economic development is a prerequisite to meaningful political participation,
and thus subsistence or welfare rights should be given priority. These argu-
ments, however, find no support in human rights treaties, which view political
participation as a keystone right-an essential prerequisite to the enjoyment of
all other rights.s The reasoning is straightforward: citizens will never attain
sufficient power to advance their own welfare unless they possess a voice in
the decisions of their government. One may conclude that human rights law
does not favor elections to the exclusion or even subordination of other rights,
Id. at 119-20.
298 Many states expressed this view during the drafting of the Political Covenant. See Commission
on Human Rights, 363dMeeting, supra note 62, at 11 (statement of Mr. Druto, Polish delegate) ("a citizen
who had no direct say in the election of the parliament and government of his country could have no
guarantee that his rights would be safeguarded"); Commission on Human Rights, 364th Meeting, supra note
62, at 4 (statement of Mr. Kriven, Ukrainian delegate) ("Mhe right to participate in government was an
essential prerequisite for the enjoyment of all other rights, including economic, social and cultural rights.").
See also European Convention, supra note 104, pmbl. (promoting protection of fundamental freedoms "by
an effective political democracy"); Mathieu-Mohn v. Belgium, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1987)
(holding that guarantee of free elections is "of prime importance in the Convention System'); Chile Report,
supra note 132, at 254 (Inter-American Commission stating that "periodic, free and authentic elections are
the best guarantee of the full exercise of the other human rights"); Haiti Report, supra note 132, at 55
("democracy is the best possible guarantee for the full exercise of human rights"); Copenhagen Document,
supra note 92, 29 I.L.M. at 1307 (stating CSCE declaration that "pluralistic democracy and the rule of
law are essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms"); Charter of Paris,
supra note 92, 30 I.L.M. at 194 ("Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance
of all groups of society, and equality of opportunity for each person.").
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but establishes participatory rights as a necessary (though certainly not suffi-
cient) condition for the achievement of other human rights.
IV. ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
A. Is Enforcement of Participatory Rights Possible?
Critics often decry the weakness of human rights enforcement mechanisms.
This claim would seem to be even stronger in the case of participatory rights.
Unlike a requirement that a government discontinue a particular human rights
violation (e.g., ceasing torture of political detainees), the enforcement of
participatory rights often requires a state to restructure its government or
constitutional system.'
Existing U.N. and regional enforcement mechanisms, which consist of non-
binding adjudications by human rights tribunals, seem unlikely candidates for
achieving such wholesale reallocations of political power. But decrying the lack
of institutional enforcement mechanisms obscures an important aspect of
participatory rights which may, in the long run, lead to too many enforcement
opportunities instead of too few. The human rights revolution brought about
a change in classical international law: in a limited number of areas individual
entitlements of dignity and autonomy displace states' rights to hegemony in
their domestic affairs. Recognition of the right to political participation, which
is included among these rights, forces the international community to move
beyond traditional human rights law and its discrete enclaves of permissible
individual claims against official abuses. Participatory rights are based on an
assessment that governments themselves result from prior, legally significant
acts (i.e., elections) by citizens who are the ultimate repositories of national
sovereignty. Hence the international community must look first to individuals
to determine whether any given government is lawfully constituted.
The bearing of this theory of legitimacy on the enforcement of participatory
rights is best illustrated through the example of South Africa. The South
African government has been declared illegitimate by virtually every state. The
United Nations and numerous individual states demanded removal of the white-
run government and enfranchisement of all South African citizens. When it
299 As Henry Steiner observed:
In given circumstances, an authoritarian government can stop torturing and arresting without
surrendering its monopoly of power. As events in Eastern Europe illustrate, however, such a
government cannot grant the right to political participation without signing its death warrant.
"Throw out the rascals" speaks the more dramatically after decades of unchosen and oppressive
regimes.
Henry J. Steiner, The Youth of Rights, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 917, 930 (1991) (reviewing Louis HENKIN, THE
AGE OF RIGHTS (1990)) (citation omitted).
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refused to comply, South Africa became an international pariah."° In sum,
because the government was itself deemed illegal, every point of interaction
between South Africa and other states presented an opportunity for those states
to condemn its government. The regime could not disassociate itself from its
objectionable policies, for the regime itself was objectionable.
These actions demonstrate a consensus among the international community
that continued interaction with the South African government implicitly affirms
its legitimacy and disavows the participatory rights of Black South Afri-
cans.30 Thus, states and international organizations can take affirmative steps
to indicate that a government which violates the participatory rights of its
citizens will not be accorded legitimacy, thereby encouraging offending
regimes that value their status in the international community to reform.3"
Governments lacking popular domestic support would be encouraged to gain
both domestic and international legitimacy by recognizing participatory rights.
As the South African example demonstrates, the international community
no longer grants states hegemonic control over their domestic affairs. This
further supports the argument that, today, the international community must
look first to the citizens of a state to determine whether a government is
lawfully constituted. The most logical way to ensure that the international
community indeed does so is to make effective, frequent use of election
monitoring missions.
B. Enforcing Participatory Rights Through the General Assembly's Accredita-
tion Process
There is one institutional enforcement mechanism that presents a unique
opportunity to enhance the right to political participation. This is the General
Assembly's accreditation of delegates, which provides a global forum in which
the international community can debate the legitimacy of governments. 3
300 Examples of sanctions are numerous. They include the refusal to seat South Africa's delegates
in the General Assembly, a world-wide trade embargo, restrictions on loans from international financial
institutions, and exclusion from international athletic competitions. See generally I.E. SAGAY, THE
SourHERN AFRcAN SITUATION AND THE EVENTUAL TRIUMPH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-36 (1991)
(detailing international sanctions on South Africa).
301 Critics might respond that South Africa is a unique case built upon discrimination based on race
and European guilt over colonial histories. But it is difficult to imagine the same degree of international
reaction, even given these other factors, if South African Blacks had had a voice in their government. At
bottom the principle at stake was that of majority rule.
302 Enforcement becomes more difficult when a state that denies its citizens participatory rights
willingly suffers the consequences of international sanctions. Again, the slow history of change in South
Africa is illustrative. Moreover, if that regime's domestic power base is unstable, it may wish to bolster
its domestic legitimacy by encouraging other states to reaffirm its legitimacy.
303 For example, the General Assembly in 1974 rejected the credentials of the South African
government because it did not represent the South African people. See First Report of the Credentials
Commitee, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 3, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/9779 (1974) (describing
Senegalese delegate's proposal to reject South African credentials on grounds that apartheid government
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This section proposes that in certain limited but crucial situations-namely,
following a monitored election-the representative nature of a government
should be dispositive in accepting its delegation's credentials.
1. The Accreditation Process
The U.N. Charter provides for membership of states, not governments. 3 '
Upon admission of a state, the focus shifts to the government purporting to
represent that state and, ultimately, to the delegation purporting to represent
the government. The General Assembly's Rules of Procedure provide that
delegates shall submit credentials, "issued either by the Head of State or
Government or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs," to the Secretary-Gener-
al."°5 The Secretary-General then transmits the credentials to a nine-member
Credentials Committee, appointed at the beginning of each General Assembly
session, which then must "examine the credentials of representatives and report
without delay" to the full Assembly."°e However, neither the Rules nor the
Charter tell the Committee and the General Assembly how to evaluate a
government's credentials.
Credentials generally are reviewed and approved without discussion. The
Credentials Committee and the General Assembly usually treat the process as
a formality, automatically accepting accrediting documents if they bear the
signature of the Head of State or Foreign Minister.3" However, there are
two types of circumstances which prompt members of the Credentials Commit-
tee to ask whether a government is in fact representative. The first occurs
when one state objects to the government of another. For example, in 1957
the United States challenged the credentials of the Hungarian government,
which had recently been installed by invading Soviet forces." 8 The second
"represented only a very small fraction of the South African population"); id. at 4 (noting acceptance of
proposal by Credentials Committee); Relationship Between The U.N. and South Africa, G.A. Res. 3207
(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
304 The Charter requires a state to meet three requirements to qualify for admission to the United
Nations: 1) be peace-loving; 2) accept the obligations of the Charter; and 3) be able and willing to carry
out those obligations. U.N. CHARTER art. 4(1). The Charter makes no reference to democratic institutions,
and the drafters of the Charter probably did not understand the requirement that a state be "peace-loving"
to have any relation to democratic institutions. See generally RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE
UNWED NATIONS CHARTER 845 (1958).
305 R. PRoc. GEN. ASSEMBLY 27.
306 R. PRoc. GEN. ASSEMBLY 28.
307 See Malvina Halberstam, Excluding Israel from the General Assembly by a Rejection of its
Credentials, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 182 (1984) (discussing dangers of failure of accreditation of Israel).
Normally, therefore, the Credentials Committee asks whether a delegation represents a government-it
assumes that a government represents a state. See Farrokh Jhabvala, The CredentialsApproach to Represen-
tation Questions in the U.N. General Assembly, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 615, 620-21 (1977).
308 UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ELEVENTH
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASsEMBLY: REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMIrrEE, U.N. Doc. A/3536
(1957). The United States based its objection on a General Assembly resolution declaring that "these
credentials had been issued by authorities established as a result of military intervention by a foreign power
Vol. 17:539, 1992
The Right to Political Participation
type, more important for this discussion, occurs when rival factions from the
same state contend to the General Assembly that each is the legitimate govern-
ment.3" The battle between the Chinese Communists which established the
People's Republic of China after capturing the Chinese mainland in 1949 and
whose forces remained in Hungary despite requests by the General Assembly for their withdrawal." Id.
at 1; see also Credentials of Representatives of the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly, G.A. Res.
1009, U.N. GAOR, llth Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/3572 (1957) (approving REPORT OF
CREDENTIALS COMM1TrEE, U.N. Doec. A/3536). The U.S. delegate argued that theresolution "castserious
doubt upon the delegation which claims to represent the Hungarian people-and, in the view of my
delegation, it does not represent them." U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., 726th mtg. at561, U.N. Doc. A/PV.726
(1957) (statement of Mr. Wadsworth, U.S. delegate). Hungary responded that "[t]he credentials of the
Hungarian delegation were issued by the Presidential Council of the People's Republic in accordance with
the required formalities" and declared the U.S. challenge "an interference in the internal affairs of
Hungary." Id. (statement of Mr. Sik, Hungarian delegate). At the end of the General Assembly debate,
during which states aligned themselves along East-West lines, the General Assembly voted to take no action
on the Hungarian credentials but to seat the delegation provisionally. The General Assembly passed identical
resolutions in the following years, and the United States ceased its challenges thereafter. See ROSALYN
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF L'ITERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 158-59 (1963) (discussing dispute over Hungarian credentials).
Similar challenges have included opposition to South African credentials by a wide array of states,
see FirstReport ofthe Credentials Committee, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 2-4, U.N. Doec. A/9779 (1974);
to Israeli credentials by Arab nations, see e.g., Credentials of Representatives of the Thiny-Seventh Session
of the GeneralAssembly, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess. Agenda Item 3, at 1, U.N Doec. A/37/563 (1982) (letter
of objection); Letter Dated 12 October 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 3,
U.N. Doec. A/37/565 (1982) (response of Israel); to Chilean credentials by the Soviet Union, see First
Report of the Credentials Committee, U.N. GAOR, 15th Special Sess., at2, U.N. Doec. A/S-15136 (1988);
First Report of the Credentials Committee, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., at 4, U.N. Doec. A/41727 (1986);
First Report of the Credentials Committee, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doec. A/39/574 (1984);
to Afghani credentials by China, Report of the Credentials Committee, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., at 3, U.N.
Doec. A/S-17/10 (1990); First Report ofthe Credentials Committee, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., at 3-4, U.N.
Doec. A/44/639 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 First Report to the Credentials Committee]; and to Grenadan
credentials by Cuba, see Second Report of the Credentials Committee, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., at 2, U.N.
Doec. A/39/574lAdd.1 (1984). Only politics seems to guide who challenges whom.
309 The recent case of Haiti provides an example. The legally elected president of Haiti was deposed
by a coup following the U.N.-monitored election. There thus were two Haitian governments: the junta
exercising actual power and the government-in-exile of President Aristide. Faced with this situation the
foreign ministers of the OAS member states decided not to accept the junta's delegates, while the General
Assembly has yet to speak on the credentials issue.
Events in Panama provide a similar example. General Noriega voided the results of the May 1989
elections after it became clear, according to all reliable accounts, that the opposition candidate won. Panama
Report, supra note 132, at 52-57; NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT'L AFFAIRS & NATIONAL
REPUBLiCAN INST. FOR INT'L AFFAIRS, THE MAY 7, 1989 PANAMANIAN ELECTIONS 59 (1989) (hereinafter
NDI & NRI, Panamanian Elections). The elections were not monitored by the United Nations, but by a
number of non-governmental organizations. Id. The Security Council invited a representative of Panama
to participate in an emergency meeting to discuss recent events, pursuant to Rule 37 of its Rules of
Procedure. U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2901st mtg. at 6, U.N. Doec. S/PV.2901 (1989). The Council,
however, was required to decide which representative to invite to participate in its deliberations. The
Secretary-General received telefaxed letters on December 20, 1989 from both General Noriega's Foreign
Minister and from the new Minister appointed by opposition presidential candidate Guillermo Endara, each
asking that their own representative be permitted to appear before the Security Council. The Secretary-
General advised that he was "not in a position to formulate an opinion as to the adequacy of the provisional
credentials which have been submitted." UNITED NATIONS, SEcUIrr COUNCIL REPORT OF SECRETARY-
GENERAL at 3, U.N Doe. S/21047 (1989). The issue was never resolved, since both delegations eventually
declined to participate in the Council's debate. U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2902d mtg. at 3-5, U.N. Dec.
S/PV.2902 (1989).
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the Kuomintang (or Nationalist) government on the island of Taiwan provides
another example.31 China was one of the four major powers issuing invita-
tions to the United Nations drafting conference at a time when the country was
under the control of General Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government."
Beginning in November 1949, however, the new communist regime began to
demand the expulsion of the Kuomintang delegation and the accreditation of
its own representatives. 1 The resulting dispute, which lasted until the
People's Republic delegation was finally seated in 1971, spawned numerous
suggestions as to how such conflicts should be resolved.
13
2. Existing Standards for Resolving Credentials Challenges
Three standards have been proposed for resolving credentials challenges
since the China dispute: assessment of whether a particular government
exercises effective control over the state; determination of the proper represen-
tative according to the "Purposes and Principles of the Charter;" and consider-
ation of whether a particular government can meet the obligations of member-
ship. None of these standards solely determines accreditation, and each fails
310 The China dispute set the precedent that conflicts between competing delegations should be
resolved by vote on the Credentials Committee's report, rather than as a separate agenda item. Contests
between competing delegations from Cambodia, the Congo, and Yemen were subsequently framed as
credentials challenges. See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES
TO THE SEVENTEENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 1990
FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIc TO THE UNITED
NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/S-17/9 (1990) (stating objections to
credentials of Democratic Kampuchea); UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, CREDENTIALS OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE FIFrEENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: FIRST REPORT OF
THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE, U.N. Doc. A/S-15/36 (1988) (same).
311 LUNG-CHU CHEN & HAROLD D. LASSWELL, FORMOSA, CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 7
(1967).
312 Herbert W. Briggs, Chinese Representation in the United Nations, 6 INT'L ORO. 192, 192 (1952).
313 The dispute over the credentials of the Chinese delegation was resolved as a separate agenda item
in 1971, after 21 years of annual challenges before the Credentials Committee. See UNITED NATIONS,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REQUEST FOR THE INCLUSION OF A SUPPLEMENTARY ITEM IN THE AGENDA OF THE
TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION: TaE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS: LETTER DATED 17
AUGUST 1971 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE
UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/8442 (1971). The Nationalist
government suggested that one essential criterion should be the degree of support a government enjoys
within its territory. It asserted that "the only possible procedure" to verify such support "consistent with
the principles of the Charter, is a fair and free election." LETTER DATED 13 MARCH 1950 FROM THE
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. S/1470, at 3 (1950).
The resolution of such conflicts during the credentials process may also determine the number of votes
needed in the General Assembly to seat a delegation. Approval of the report of the Credentials Committee,
like most other issues before the Assembly, requires only a simple majority. Under Article 18(2) of the
Charter, however, an "important question" requires the approval of two-thirds of the members present and
voting. Article 18(2) contains a non-exclusive list of'important issues," including several that are analogous
to the choice between two delegations: suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, expulsion
of members, and admission of new members.
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to consider a government's obligation to assure the participatory fights of its
inhabitants.
The effective control standard requires accreditation of whatever govern-
ment exercises actual authority in a state,314 a standard applied by most states
in their bilateral relations.315 Under this standard, the United Nations must
seat the representative of any new government following a change in leader-
ship. The principal advantage of the "effective control" test is its simplicity,
as no investigation occurs into the new government's policies or the means by
which it attained power. Furthermore, the test ensures that the United Nations
will not be composed of paper governments.316 If the United Nations is to
help maintain international security, proponents of this standard argue, its
members must exercise actual power over people and resources.
The second standard arose from the debate over the accreditation of the
Chinese delegation in 1950, when the Soviet Union attempted to have the
Kuomintang representative excluded from the Economic and Social Coun-
cil.31 7 The General Assembly established an ad hoc Political Committee to
consider the issue318 and propose recommendations.3"9 The General Assem-
bly adopted these recommendations in Resolution 396(V):
314 See Yuen-Li Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations, 45 AM. J. INT'L
L. 689, 695 (1951) (discussing effective control standard).
315 See Tom J. Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 503, 510 (1990)
(noting "the virtually uniform practice in international relations of treating any group of nationals in
effective control of their state as constituting its legitimate government").
316 Briggs, supra note 312, at 207.
317 Liang, supra note 314, at 693.
318 The working document before the Political Committee consisted of a draft resolution submitted
by Cuba, proposing the following criteria for determining representativeness: "(a) effective authority over
the national territory; (b) the general consent of the population; (c) ability and willingness to achieve the
Purposes of the Charter, to observe its Principles, and to fulfill the international obligations of the state;
and (d) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." Recognition by the United Nations of the
Representation ofa Member State, U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Political Comm., 5th Sess., Agenda Item 61, at
1, U.N. Doc A/AC.381L.6 (1950). The subcommittee also considered a number of other drafts. The most
frequently discussed draft was submitted by the United Kingdom, which advocated the effective control
test plus a requirement that the government enjoy "the obedience of the bulk of the population of that
territory, in such a way that this control, authority and obedience appear to be of a permanent character."
Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State, U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Political
Comm., 5th Sess., Agenda Item 61, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.38/L.21/Rev.1 (1950).
319 The subcommittee's draft resolution recommended four criteria: 1) general consideration of
governments "in light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case;"
2) "[t]he extent to which the new authority exercises effective control over the territory of the Member
State... and is generally accepted by the population;" 3) "[t]he willingness of that authority to accept
responsibility for the carrying out [of] ... its obligations under the Charter;" and 4) "Itlhe extent to which
that authority has been established through the internal processes in the Member State." Recognition by
the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State, U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Political Comm., 5th
Sess., Agenda Item 61, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/AC.381L.45 (1950). At its meeting on November 27, 1950,
the full committee adopted an Egyptian proposal to delete all but the first criterion. Recognition by the
United Nations of the Representation of a Member State, U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Political Comm., 5th Sess.,
57th mtg., Agenda Item 61, at 364-67, U.N. Doc. A/1292.A/1308, A/1344, A/AC.381L.45 (1950).
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[W]henever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to
represent a Member State in the United Nations, and this question becomes the
subject of controversy in the United Nations, it should be considered in the light
of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each
case. 32
Unfortunately, this standard begs more questions than it answers: what precise-
ly are "the Purposes and Principles of the Charter," and do they necessarily
include fidelity to democratic elections? Or is non-intervention in domestic
affairs such a principle? Resolution 396 (V) is so vague that it gives member
states virtually "unfettered discretion in exercising their political judgments on
the question of representation. 
321
The third standard is set out in a legal memorandum on the representation
question, issued by Secretary-General Trygve Lie at the outset of the China
controversy. 3 1 The Lie Memorandum focused primarily on how to avoid
subjective political judgments in the accreditation process: "The United Nations
is not an association limited to like-minded States and governments of similar
ideological persuasion (as is the case in certain regional associations). As an
Organization which aspires to universality, it must of necessity include States
of varying and even conflicting ideologies. "3 Lie proposed that the criteria
for recognition should reflect the ideologically neutral standard for membership
contained in Article 4 of the Charter. 324 He suggested that where two rival
governments present formally valid credentials, the General Assembly should
focus upon "which of these two governments in fact is in a position to employ
the resources and direct the people of the State in fulfillment of the obligations
of membership. 0' This standard shares the concern for domestic authority
found in the effective control standard, but adds the extra requirement that
control be sufficient to fulfill the obligations of U.N. membership. Since the
Lie standard does not require that the regime actually be committed to fulfilling
Charter obligations, it adds little of substance to the effective control test.
320 Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State, G.A. Res. 396 (V),
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
321 Jhabvala, supra note 307, at 632.
322 Letter Dated 8 March 1950from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council
Transmitting a Memorandun on the Legal Aspects of the Problem of Representation in the United Nations,
U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., at 1-6, U.N. Doc. S11466 (1950) [hereinafter Lie Memorandum].
323 Id. at 5.
324 Article 4 states in part: "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization,
are able and willing to carry out these obligations." U.N. CHARTER art. 4.
325 Id. at 6.
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C. The Proposed Standard: Using the Results of Monitored Elections to
Resolve Credentials Disputes
How would the three existing accreditation standards work when the results
of a U.N.-monitored election are overturned and an incumbent regime refuses
to yield power? The incumbent's delegation would probably be seated, as the
outcome under Resolution 396(V) is uncertain. I suggest here that the election
results-as certified by U.N. observers to have been the result of a free and
fair process-be used by the General Assembly as a basis for seating the
opposition representatives.3
Admittedly, this scenario will not occur often; but the rarity of such
episodes does not diminish their capacity to enhance the acceptance of the right
to political participation. The General Assembly in this case would be faced
with a stark choice between an elected regime and one staunchly resisting the
authority of popular sovereignty, and the General Assembly will inevitably bee
seen as supporting or undermining participatory rights. Even infrequent
accreditation disputes therefore create decisions of great precedential
weight.3 27
The justification for accrediting elected regimes lies in the new relationship
between the United Nations and the citizens of states in which elections are
monitored. Each observer mission embodies a commitment by the United
Nations to uphold and enforce participatory rights. 32' What does it mean for
the United Nations to undertake such a commitment? In seeking to enforce
participatory rights the United Nations will have dispatched a mission to assist
in the election of a government which fairly represents the views of its popu-
lation. The United Nation's responsibility in such a situation is to a nation's
individual citizens. 31 It is in this spirit that the General Assembly, in con-
demning the coup in Haiti, quoted from Article 21 of the Universal Declara-
tion: "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of govern-
326 A decision on this issue would begin when two factions submit credentials to the Secretary-
General. The General Assembly could approve the Credentials Committee's choice by a simple majority
vote on the Committee's report. Alternatively, the issue could be considered as a separate agenda item,
which would require eithera simple majority, or a two-thirds majority if itwere designated an "important"
issue under Article 18(2) of the Charter. If so designated it is possible that neither delegation would obtain
support of two-thirds of the member states, and the existing delegation would continue to be seated
provisionally until a final decision was reached. See R. PROC. GEN. ASSEMBLY 29.
327 This principle should not be limited to cases of election monitoring by invitation. The consent
of the monitored state simply permits the United Nations to gather the best possible evidence on which to
base a credentials decision, and is equally applicable to non-monitored elections, which present the question
of whether a winner could be determined with an acceptable degree of accuracy.
328 The recipient state itselfalready may have undertaken such a commitment if it ratified the Political
Covenant or one of its regional equivalents.
329 In the aftermath of the 1989 Panamanian elections, the O.A.S. Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs declared that the voiding of the election had "abridged the right of the Panamanian people
to freely elect their legitimate authorities." OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.FIII.21, Doc. 8/89 rev. 2 (1989).
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ment."330 The question posed by the credentials fight is whether the General
Assembly will continue to regard the citizens as sovereign in choosing between
competing delegations. By granting accreditation solely to the elected govern-
ment the General Assembly will effectively fuse the norms of the Political
Covenant with the enforcement capacity of observer missions and will make
clear its commitment to popular sovereignty.
In addition, basing accreditation upon election results provides a far more
objective standard than the three standards currently applied. Current standards
falter when faced with a successful guerilla insurgency or a full-blown civil
war, as any government's control may be only temporary if sustained purely
through force. These current standards also present opportunities for manipula-
tion and promote ideologically-driven debate. The results of monitored elec-
tions, by contrast, provide verifiable data that can be scrutinized.
D. Criticisms of Accreditation Based Upon Elected Governments
This proposal is based on the simple premise that a government, certified
to have been elected by the majority of its citizens, should represent those
citizens in the United Nations. Arguments made by several states in the past
contradict such a standard: protection of sovereignty prohibits international
intrusion into domestic affairs; accreditation must be based on real, not pur-
ported authority; and accreditation should remain a purely formal exercise.
Close examination of these positions, however, demonstrates that they are
inconsistent with the international law of participatory rights.
1. Choosing Between Governments is an Unwarranted Intrusion into a
State's Sovereignty
Several states have argued that the Charter provides the United Nations
with no mandate to comment or act on the results of elections, even those it
has monitored, because domestic elections "can never be regarded as affecting
international peace and security." 331 There are two answers to this criticism.
First, the incumbent government has already consented to election monitoring
by the time the credentials debate occurs, and thus it already has allowed an
"intrusion" by the United Nations into its sovereignty. Second, this view is
based on the old notion of sovereignty as absolute domestic hegemony, a
concept surpassed by the new human rights regime. The ascendance of partici-
patory rights has recast sovereignty as the power enjoyed by those entitled to
govern. Elections provide an empirical test of the right of an incumbent
330 G.A. Res. 4617, supra note 262.
331 See, e.g., TWENTY-NTIH MEETING, supra note 248, at 58-59 (statement of Cuban delegate).
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government to exercise power. If a majority of citizens votes against the
incumbent regime, the locus of sovereignty shifts to the prevailing candidate.
The theory of legitimacy embodied in the Political Covenant holds that the
defeated government is no longer entitled to speak for the state.
2. The United Nations Must Be Composed of Governments that Possess
Actual Power and not "Paper Governments"
Other critics might argue that the proposed standard potentially could lead
to the seating of governments-in-exile or powerless opposition movements by
making electoral victory the sole criterion for accreditation. According to these
critics, two dangers are thereby apparent. First, as Secretary-General Lie stated
in his memorandum on the Chinese dispute, "[t]he obligations of membership
can be carried out only by governments which in fact possess the power to do
so."332 A "paper government" could not, for example, make armed forces
available in response to a request from the Security Council under Chapter VII
of the Charter.33 Second, the United Nations would lose any leverage it
might have to influence the policies of excluded unelected governments. 34
Both these objections in effect advocate the effective control standard.
The work of the United Nations, however, will not be interrupted by the
accreditation of a government-in-exile. The organization receives most of its
funds from countries not likely to be the subject of election monitoring and,
as the recent effort against Iraq demonstrates, efforts at collective security can
be undertaken with only a small percentage of member states providing troops
and materiel. In addition, arguments about the "effectiveness" of the United
Nations cut both ways. The organization's effective support for human rights
would be greatly diminished if it seated delegations of governments that violate
a treaty obligation to protect participatory rights or disregard the results of a
monitored election.
The second criticism-that incumbent governments denied a General
Assembly seat will no longer be subject to international pressure-exaggerates
the stability of those regimes, thereby overestimating the need for direct
confrontation at the United Nations. As the disintegration of Soviet political
332 Lie Memorandum, supra note 322, at 6.
333 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
334 See Louis B. Sohn, Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization, 77
HARv. L. REV. 1381, 1388 (1964) (discussing debate over expelling Soviet Union from League of Nations
after its invasion of Finland in November 1939). For example, many U.N. delegates now consider the 1974
decision to reject South Africa's credentials a mistake which insulated South Africa from having to face
and answer its numerous critics. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
133 (1990) (detailing viewpoint). Of course, now that South Africa has announced its intention to dismantle
the core of apartheid, this argument must focus on whether U.N. criticism would have accomplished the
same result more quickly. See Christopher S. Wren, South Africa Moves to Scrap Apartheid, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1991, at Al.
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institutions suggests, authoritarian governments cannot hope to liberalize
domestic political debate and maintain control in the long term. A government
which has opened its society to the extent necessary to permit a monitored
election will face widespread internal and external opposition if it refuses to
respect the results of that election. The United Nations need not compromise
the integrity of its monitoring efforts to add face-to-face criticism to the level
of internal and external condemnation such a government would surely encoun-
ter.
3. The Credentials Process Should Remain a Purely Formal Exercise,
Untainted by Political Considerations
Accreditation debates often resound with categorical statements that the
credentials process is no more than a formality of accepting proper documenta-
tion signed by the proper domestic authorities.33s There are two problems
with this position. First, the process cannot be considered pro forma when two
or more delegations present credentials signed by different presidents or
foreign ministers of the same state. Because the General Assembly must choose
between them, the legitimacy of both must be scrutinized. Second, virtually
no state follows a purely formal accreditation policy in practice. Credentials
challenges occur frequently, and member states question far more than the
formal requisites of the accrediting documents. Adoption of a standard based
on monitored elections could actually decrease the frequency of these challeng-
es by providing an objective standard of assessment.
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusions we may draw concerning the right to political participation
now seem straightforward. That receipt of an electoral mandate bestows
legitimacy upon governments, that genuine choice in an election requires
multiple political parties, that incumbent regimes cannot monopolize the mass
media during a campaign, and that the other elements of fair elections must
be provided, all seem to flow inevitably from treaties announcing a commit-
ment to representative government.336 It is becoming increasingly difficult to
find either states or international institutions which argue as a matter of
335 See, e.g., Credentials ofRepresentatives to the Fony-First Session of the General Assembly: First
Report of the Credentials Committee, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 3, at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/41l727 (1986) ('If members of the Committee failed to recognize the technical nature of the credentials
exercise and rejected the credentials of a country's representatives merely because they did not like its
Government's policies it would lead to chaos in international relations.") (response of United States
representative to Soviet challenge to Cambodian credentials).
336 These conclusions may not apply to the African Charter. See supra part II.B.4.
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principle that factors such as these should be excluded from the definition of
a "free and fair" election.
It is the seemingly mundane nature of this emerging consensus that is its
most remarkable feature. Only four years ago Henry Steiner observed that the
right to political participation "expresses less a vital concept meant to univer-
salize certain practices than a bundle of concepts, sometimes complementary
but sometimes antagonistic."337 This right, he noted, functioned less as a
model of conduct than as a "weapon of rhetorical battle" through which "each
of the world's ideological blocs, infusing the right with its own understandings,
attacks the others for violating those understandings."33 In Professor
Franck's terminology, the legitimacy of the right suffered from its lack of
determinacy.339
This indeterminacy no longer exists. While one must not overstate the case,
the list of sources is impressive; the constituent elements of the right to
political participation can be derived from global and regional human rights
treaties, thirty-five years of U.N. election monitoring reports, decisions of the
United Nations Human Rights Committee and two regional tribunals, and two
new CSCE instruments which count among their signatories all the former
Soviet bloc nations. Questions concerning the boundaries of participatory rights
no longer require resolution of ideological debates about the proper function
of government, but involve treaty interpretation.
In sum, parties to the major human rights conventions have created an
international law of participatory rights. They have agreed to open their
political institutions to inspection for the purpose of ensuring minimum stan-
dards of procedural fairness. In the process, the nineteenth century concept
of the nation-state has undergone a substantial change: international notions
of legitimacy are no longer oblivious to the origin of governments, but have
come to approximate quite closely those domestic conceptions embodied in
theories of popular sovereignty. In Professor Reisman's words, "[i]nternational
law still protects sovereignty, but-not surprisingly-it is the people's sover-
eignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty.""
This does not, however, diminish the importance of the nation-state itself.
On the contrary, treaties such as the Political Covenant exist as profound
reaffirnations of the state as the essential forum of political activity and
expression. In its new role as ombudsman, the international community simply
ensures that all citizens within a state have the opportunity to exercise their
right to political participation.
337 Steiner, supra note 14, at 77.
338 Id.
339 See FRANCK, supra note 334, at 50-66.
340 W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Hunan Rights in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 84 AM.
J. INT'L L. 866, 869 (1990).

